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Abstract	
	
This	 article	 is	 concerned	 with	 the	 role	 and	 relevance	 of	 non-signatories	 in	
international	 commercial	 arbitration.	 The	 article	 challenges	 the	 efficacy	 and	
coherence	of	the	existing	arbitration	law	in	this	area,	and	questions	whether	the	
traditional	 concept	 of	 consent	 for	 arbitration	 can	 be	 reconciled	 with	 complex	
commercial	reality	and	non-signatories	today.	Instead,	the	article	submits	that	a	
general	 theory	on	non-signatories	 is	needed,	 and	proposes	 that	 the	 theoretical	
basis	for	finding	that	non-signatories	have	rights	or	obligations	in	an	arbitration	
should	be	shifted	from	the	concept	of	consent	to	the	concept	of	a	‘dispute’.	
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I. INTRODUCTION:	 NON-SIGNATORIES	 AND	 CONTEMPORARY	
INTERNATIONAL	COMMERCE	
	
This	 article	 is	 concerned	 with	 the	 role	 and	 relevance	 of	 non-signatories	 in	
international	 commercial	 arbitration.	 Non-signatory	 is	 a	 party	 that	 has	 not	
formally	 entered	 into	 an	 arbitration	 agreement,	 although	 it	 is	 implicated	 in	 a	
dispute	 which	 is	 the	 subject	 matter	 of	 an	 arbitration.	 In	 spite	 of	 voluminous	
academic	 literature,	 court	 decisions	 and	 arbitral	 awards,	 the	 debate	 on	 non-
signatories	remains	largely	unsettled	and	has	become	one	of	the	most	pervasive	
issues	 in	 the	 field	 of	 international	 commercial	 arbitration. 1 		 This	 article	
challenges	the	efficacy	and	coherence	of	the	existing	arbitration	law	and	instead	
proposes	a	new	unifying	theory	for	non-signatories.	
	
In	 litigation,	 parties	 whose	 legal	 interests	 are	 directly	 affected	 by	 the	
resolution	of	 a	 dispute	have	 the	 right	 to	 standing	 in	 the	 court	 proceedings.	By	
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contrast,	 whether	 a	 party	 is	 able	 or	 obliged	 to	 participate	 in	 an	 arbitration	
depends	on	whether	 such	party	has	previously	entered	 into	a	valid	arbitration	
contract.	Any	legal	or	financial	interest	that	a	party	may	have	in	the	outcome	of	
an	arbitration	cannot	assist	it	to	participate	and	protect	its	interests.		
	
Traditionally,	 its	 consensual	underpinnings	made	arbitration	a	 flexible	and	
popular	method	 for	resolving	disputes	especially	 in	bilateral	 transactions,	 such	
as	sales	of	goods	and	transport	contracts.2	However,	the	contractual	and	bilateral	
nature	 of	 arbitration	 is	 often	 unable	 to	 accommodate	 modern	 business	
transactions	that	are	typically	multifaceted,	multiparty	and	multi-contract.		
	
The	 increasing	 complexity	 of	 contemporary	 international	 commerce	 is	
particularly	evident	in	areas	such	as	construction	contracts,	maritime	contracts,	
merger	 and	 acquisition	 transactions,	 banking	 and	 financial	 transactions,	 joint	
venture	 agreements,	 supply	 chain	 contracts,	 insurance	 and	 reinsurance	
contracts,	and	transactions	with	states	operating	through	a	wide	range	of	state	
entities	and	instrumentalities.	Similarly,	a	large	number	of	international	business	
transactions	involve	multinational	groups	of	companies,	which	nowadays	tend	to	
adopt	 corporate	 structures	 that	 are	more	 sophisticated	 than	 the	 linear	parent-
subsidiary	 type	of	organization.	Corporate	groups	may	take	the	 form	of	groups	
based	on	contract	or	equity,	joint	ventures	between	independent	firms,	informal	
alliances,	 publicly	 owned	 multinationals,	 and	 supranational	 forms	 of	
international	business.3	
	
The	 unprecedented	 scale	 of	 sophistication	 of	 international	 commerce	
presents	 crucial	 challenges	 for	 international	 commercial	 arbitration	 today	 and	
tests	its	traditional	role	and	contractual	nature	to	its	limits.		
	
How	should	we	treat,	for	example,	a	State	that	sets	up	an	instrumentality	to	
sign	a	contract,	including	an	arbitration	clause,	which	the	State	negotiated	in	the	
first	 place?	 What	 should	 happen	 if	 the	 State	 is	 clearly	 implicated	 in	 the	
performance	 of	 the	 contract	 and	 the	 instrumentality	 (conveniently)	 ceases	 to	
exist	by	the	time	a	dispute	arises?	Can	the	claimant	bring	the	non-signatory	State	
before	an	arbitral	 tribunal,	 or	does	 it	have	 to	 settle	 for	 the	 rather	unappealing	
prospect	of	bringing	a	claim	against	the	State	before	the	State’s	own	courts?		
	
Similarly,	how	should	we	deal	with	disputes	arising	out	of	transactions	with	
multinational	groups	of	companies?	Adopting	a	corporate	group	structure	can	be	
a	 very	 effective	 mode	 of	 corporate	 organisation	 and	 operation,	 which	 allows	
multinationals	 to	 rationalise	 the	division	of	 tasks	 and	 labour	within	 the	group.	
However,	 in	 practice,	 only	 the	 company	 that	 signs	 the	 contract	 (typically	 a	
subsidiary	 or	 a	 special	 purpose	 vehicle	 with	 limited	 funds),	 containing	 an	
arbitration	agreement,	will	have	a	standing	to	participate	in	the	arbitration.	Non-
signatory	 companies	 of	 the	 same	 group	 will	 typically	 be	 excluded	 from	
arbitration	proceedings,	irrespective	of	whether	they	have	been	involved	in	the	
underlying	 substantive	 transaction.	 But,	 if	 the	 notion	 of	 corporate	 group	
																																																								
2	See	Derek	Roebuck,	Mediation	and	Arbitration	in	the	Middle	Ages	(Holo	Books	2013).	
3	P	Muchlinski,	Multinational	Enterprises	and	the	Law	(Blackwell	1999)	62.	
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structure	 makes	 good	 commercial	 sense	 in	 practice,	 why	 does	 arbitration	
doctrine	ignore	it?	Why	is	a	parent	company,	for	example,	unable	to	bring	a	claim	
before	an	arbitral	tribunal	requesting	damages	suffered	by	the	group	as	a	whole?	
Equally,	why	is	a	claimant	able	to	bring	a	signatory	subsidiary	(with	limited	or	no	
available	funds)	before	an	arbitral	tribunal	but	not	the	parent	company	too?		
	
Businesspersons	may	be	displeased	to	find	out	that	commercial	reality	may	
have	 outgrown	 the	 idea	 of	 bilateral	 contractual	 arbitration,	 which	 tends	 to	
exclude	 non-signatory	 parties	 from	 the	 arbitration	 process,	 no	 matter	 how	
strongly	 they	 may	 be	 implicated	 in	 the	 commercial	 side	 of	 a	 project	 and	 the	
ensuing	dispute.				
	
The	problem	with	non-signatories	in	international	commercial	arbitration	is	
not	new.	 	One	of	the	first	awards	dealing	with	non-signatories	goes	back	in	the	
1970s,4	while	the	seminal	article	of	Professor	Ibrahim	Fadlallah	discussing	non-
signatories	 in	 the	 context	 of	 corporate	 groups	 was	 published	 in	 1987.5	Since	
then,	 arbitration	 doctrine	 and	 practice	 has	 attempted	 to	 respond	 to	 the	 non-
signatory	challenge	with	a	wide	range	of	theories	and	legal	constructs.	Over	the	
course	of	the	 last	thirty	years,	non-signatories	have	been	allowed	or	compelled	
to	 arbitrate	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 disparate	 doctrines	 such	 as	 agency	 and	 apparent	
authority,	 assignment,	 estoppel,	 alter	 ego	 and	 lifting	 the	 corporate	 veil,	 third-
party	 beneficiary,	 incorporation	 by	 reference	 and	 not	 least	 the	 controversial	
doctrine	of	‘group	of	companies’.	
	
As	 is	 generally	 accepted,	most	 non-signatory	 theories	 are	premised	on	 the	
idea	of	implied	consent,	namely	the	idea	that	a	non-signatory	can	be	bound	by	an	
arbitration	 agreement,	 which	 it	 never	 signed,	 if	 it	 is	 found	 to	 have	 implicitly	
consented	to	it	by	conduct.6		
	
This	 article	 challenges	 the	 theoretical	 coherence	 and	practical	 propriety	of	
the	 non-signatory	 theories	 based	 on	 consent.	 More	 fundamentally,	 the	 article	
questions	 whether	 the	 traditional	 concept	 of	 consent	 for	 arbitration	 can	 be	
reconciled	 with	 complex	 commercial	 reality	 and	 the	 role	 of	 non-signatories	
today.	As	 is	 shown,	while	 the	 existing	non-signatory	 theories	 can	work	well	 in	
straightforward	circumstances,	 they	are	often	unable	 to	accommodate	complex	
multiparty	 transactions	 that	 invariably	 involve	 non-signatories,	 in	 particular	
transactions	 with	 corporate	 groups	 and	 state	 entities.	 As	 is	 argued,	 this	 owes	
much	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 arbitration	 law	 on	 non-signatories	 has	 developed	 as	 a	
fragmented	body	of	a	wide	number	of	disparate	doctrines,	which	do	not	account	
for	a	general	theory	of	non-signatories	in	arbitration.	
	
																																																								
4	See	 ICC	 case	 no	 2138	 of	 1974,	 in	 Y	 Derains	 and	 S	 Jarvin	 (eds),	 ICC	Arbitral	Awards	1974–85	
(Kluwer,	 1990),	 934;	 see	 also	 ICC	 case	 no	 1434	 of	 1975,	 in	 Y	 Derains	 and	 S	 Jarvin	 (eds),	 ICC	
Arbitral	Awards	1974–85	(Kluwer,	1990),	263.	
5	I	 Fadlallah,	 ‘Clause	d’arbitrage	 et	 groupes	de	 sociétés’	 (1987)	Travaux	du	Comité	Français	de	
Droit	International	Privé	1984–1985	105.		
6	See	 B	 Hanotiau,	 Complex	 Arbitrations:	Multiparty,	Multicontract,	Multi-issue,	 and	 Class	 Actions	
(Kluwer,	2003).	E	Silva	Romero	&	L	M	Velarde	Saffer,	“The	Extension	of	the	Arbitral	Agreement	
to	Non-Signatories	in	Europe:	a	Uniform	Approach?”	5	Am.	U.	Bus.	L.	Rev.	2015-2016,	372.	
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The	article	submits	that	a	unifying	theory	for	non-signatories	is	needed	and	
goes	on	to	propose	that,	under	such	theory,	the	theoretical	basis	for	finding	that	
non-signatories	 have	 rights	 or	 obligations	 in	 an	 arbitration	 should	 be	 shifted	
from	 the	 concept	 of	 consent	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 dispute.	 Under	 the	 proposed	
theory,	what	matters	 is	 not	whether	 a	 non-signatory	 can	demonstrate	 consent	
for	arbitration,	but	whether	it	is	inextricably	implicated	in	a	dispute	which	is	the	
subject	matter	of	an	arbitration.		
	
The	 article	 proceeds	 as	 follows.	 After	 a	 brief	 discussion	 of	 the	 most	
important	 non-signatory	 theories	 in	 Section	 II,	 Section	 III	 offers	 a	 critique	 of	
these	theories.	As	is	demonstrated,	there	is	a	clear	divide	between	rhetoric	and	
actual	 practice	 in	 respect	 of	 non-signatories	 in	 international	 commercial	
arbitration.	 While	 courts	 and	 tribunals	 insist	 that	 whether	 a	 non-signatory	 is	
bound	 by	 an	 arbitration	 agreement	 is	 a	matter	 of	 consent,	 in	 reality	 the	 non-
signatory	 theories	 they	 apply	 are	 often	 alien	 to	 fundamental	 principles	 of	
consent.	 Section	 III	 goes	on	 to	 argue	 that	 arbitration	 law	on	non-signatories	 is	
often	unable	to	accommodate	complex	commercial	reality,	because	in	essence	it	
is	a	body	of	fragmented	theories	that	have	been	largely	borrowed	from	national	
contract	 laws	 rather	 than	 developed	 for	 the	 distinct	 purposes	 of	 international	
arbitration.	 Finally,	 Section	 IV	 sets	 out	 the	 fundamental	 elements	 of	 a	 new	
unifying	theory	on	non-signatories	based	on	the	concept	of	dispute.		
	
	
II. THE	EVOLUTION	OF	ARBITRATION	LAW	ON	NON-SIGNATORIES		
	
A. Non-signatories	and	Ordinary	Doctrines	of	Contract	and	Company	Law	
	
Traditionally,	arbitration	has	been	used	for	the	resolution	of	disputes	arising	out	
of	bilateral	transactions,	mainly	sales	of	goods	and	transport	contracts.	However,	
with	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 non-arbitrability	 doctrine	 in	 the	 past	 forty	 years,7	and	
the	policy	of	a	large	number	of	national	laws	favouring	international	arbitration,	
the	scope	of	arbitration	has	greatly	expanded.	Currently,	arbitration	clauses	are	
found	 in	 almost	 all	 forms	 of	 commercial	 contracts,	 including	 complex	 and	
multiparty	projects.		
	
However,	its	expansion	to	multiparty	transactions	has	exposed	the	inherent	
limitations	of	arbitration	which	was	traditionally	conceived	and	developed	as	a	
bilateral	dispute	resolution	system.	 Importantly,	questions	have	been	raised	as	
to	how	non-signatory	parties	 could	be	 granted	 some	ability	 to	 intervene	or	be	
joined	in	an	arbitration	deciding	on	a	dispute	which	implicated	them.8		
	
																																																								
7	The	non-arbitrability	doctrine	refers	to	the	body	of	rules	whereby	certain	types	of	arbitration	
disputes,	 such	 as	 tax	 and	 insolvency	 disputes	 or	 other	 disputes	 associated	with	 public	 policy,	
cannot	 be	 submitted	 to	 arbitration.	 See	more	 in	 K.	 Youssef,	 ‘The	Death	 of	 Inarbitrability’	 in	 L.	
Mistelis	 and	 S.	 Brekoulakis	 (eds),	 Arbitrability:	 International	 and	 Comparative	 Perspectives	
(Alphen	aan	den	Rijn:	Kluwer,	2009)	47.	See	generally,	Mistelis	and	Brekoulakis	(eds),	ibid.	
8	S.	I.	Strong,	“Intervention	and	Joinder	as	of	Right	in	International	Arbitration:	an	Infringement	
of	Individual	Contract	Rights	or	a	Proper	Equitable	Measure?”	31	VandJ	Transnatl	La	915	at	920.	
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Arbitration’s	response	to	non-signatories	has	been,	intuitively,	to	rely	on	its	
contractual	 instincts.	 National	 courts	 and	 arbitration	 tribunals	 have	 been	
treating	parties	who	 fail	 to	 sign	 an	 arbitration	 agreement	 as	 they	 treat	 parties	
who	fail	to	sign	an	ordinary	contract,	namely	by	relying	on	well-known	doctrines	
of	 contract	 law	 that	 purport	 to	 extend	 the	 contractual	 boundaries	 to	 third	
parties.	Thus,	a	wide	range	of	contract	law	doctrines	dealing	with	third	parties,	
such	as	agency	and	representation,	assignment,	 incorporation	by	reference	and	
third-party	beneficiary	have	been	 employed	by	national	 courts	 and	 arbitration	
tribunals	to	deal	with	non-signatories	in	arbitration	too.		
	
The	 idea	 here	 is	 simple,	 if	 unsophisticated.	 If	 the	 underlying	 contract	 can	
extend	 to	 a	 non-signatory	 pursuant	 to	 a	 contract	 law	 doctrine,	 the	 arbitration	
clause	 in	 that	 contract	 should	 be	 able	 to	 extend	 to	 the	non-signatory	 too.	 	 For	
example,	a	wide	number	of	jurisdictions,	including	Austria,9	England,10	France,11	
Germany,12	Switzerland13	and	 the	 US14	accept	 the	 idea	 that	 when	 a	 claim	 or	 a	
contract	 is	 transferred	 to	 a	 third	 party	 by	 way	 of	 assignment,	 the	 arbitration	
clause	contained	in	that	contract	will	be	transferred	to	that	party	too.			
	
Similarly,	 under	 most	 national	 laws,	 when	 two	 parties	 agree	 to	 grant	 the	
substantive	benefit	of	their	contract	to	a	third	party,	the	third	party	beneficiary	
may	 benefit	 from	 the	 arbitration	 clause	 in	 that	 contract	 too.15	Likewise,	 it	 is	
generally	accepted	that	when	an	agent	possesses	actual	authority	and	power	to	
sign	 an	 arbitration	 agreement	 in	 the	 name	 and	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 principal,	 the	
non-signatory	 principal	 will	 be	 bound	 by	 the	 arbitration	 agreement.16	General	
principles	 of	 agency	 law	also	 come	 into	play	when	 a	non-signatory,	 typically	 a	
State,	attempts	to	rely	on	idiosyncratic	formalities	of	its	national	law	to	deny	that	
it	 has	 validly	 authorised	 a	 state	 entity	 to	 sign	 an	 arbitration	 agreement	 on	 its	
behalf.	 In	 these	 circumstances,	 tribunals	 have	 applied	 the	 legal	 doctrine	 of	
apparent	or	ostensible	authority	 to	 compel	 the	non-signatory	State	 to	 arbitrate,	
especially	 if	 the	State	has	given	 the	reasonable	 impression	 that	 the	state	entity	
was	generally	acting	on	behalf	of	the	State.17		
																																																								
9	OGH	13	June	1995,	4	Ob	533/95,	SZ	68/112.		
10	E.g.	Montedipe	v	JTP-Ro	Jugotanker	(The	Jordan	Nicolov)	[1990]	2	Lloyd’s	Rep	11.	
11CA	Paris,	CCC	Filmkunst	v	EDIF	28	January	1988,	(1988)	Rev	Arb	565.	
12	12	November	 1990—Bundesgerichtshof	 (Federal	 Supreme	 Court),	 in	 A-J	 van	 den	 Berg	 (ed),	
Yearbook	of	Commercial	Arbitration	xvii	(Kluwer	1992)	510–12.	
13	E.g.	Switzerland	Swiss	Federal	Tribunal,	9	May	2001,	(2002)	20	ASA	Bull	80.		
14	E.g.	Asset	Allocation	and	Management	v	Western	Employer	892	F	2d	566	(7th	Cir	1989).	
15	E.g.	Nisshin	Shipping	Co	Ltd	v	Cleaves	&	Co	Ltd	[2003]	EWHC	2602	(Comm)	and	more	recently	
Fortress	Value	Recovery	Fund	I	LLC	&	Ors	v.	Blue	Skye	Special	Opportunities	Fund	LP	&	Ors	 [2013]	
EWCA	Civ	367.	Cf	also	UK	Contracts	(Rights	of	Third	Parties)	Act	1999,	s	8	provides	that	where	a	
party	conferred	to	a	third-party	beneficiary	is	subject	to	a	valid	arbitration	clause,	the	third	party	
shall	be	treated	as	a	party	to	that	arbitration	clause	as	regards	disputes	between	the	third	party	
and	the	promisor	For	France,	see	Cour	de	Cassation	11	July	2006,	(2006)	Rev	Arb		969,	with	note	
C	Larroumet.	
16	For	 England,	 see	 Capital	 Trust	 Inv	 Ltd	 v	 Radio	 Design	 TJ	 AB	 [2002]	 EWCA	 Civ	 135	 (English	
Court	 of	 Appeal);	 for	 the	 US,	 see	 for	 example	Westmoreland	 v	 Sadoux,	 299	 F	 3d	 462	 (5th	 Cir	
2002).	For	France,	see	Cass	2e	civ,	14	October	1987,	Ampafrance	v	Wasteels	(1988)	Rev	Arb	288,	
with	note	J-L	Goutal.		
17	See	for	example	ICC	Partial	Award	on	Jurisdiction	and	Admissibility	in	case	no.	6474	of	1992	in	
A-J	van	den	Berg	(ed),	Yearbook	of	Commercial	Arbitration,	XXV	(Kluwer	Law	International,	2000)	
279–311.		
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On	 other	 occasions,	 national	 courts,	 mostly	 in	 the	 US,	 have	 relied	 on	
principles	 of	 estoppel	 to	 compel	 a	 non-signatory	 to	 arbitrate	 when	 the	 latter	
seeks	to	enforce	substantive	rights	under	a	contract	that	contains	an	arbitration	
clause.18 	When,	 for	 example,	 a	 non-signatory	 buyer	 brings	 a	 claim	 directly	
against	the	manufacturer	relying	on	warranty	provisions	in	the	contract	between	
the	manufacturer	and	the	distributor,	the	non-signatory	buyer	may	be	estopped	
from	denying	 the	 arbitration	 clause	 in	 the	 contract	 between	 the	manufacturer	
and	the	distributor.19	
	
Finally,	 the	 doctrine	 of	 lifting	 the	 corporate	 veil,	 which	 was	 originally	
developed	 in	 company	 law	 to	 prevent	 abuse	 of	 the	 legal	 principle	 of	 limited	
liability,20	has	 been	 used	 to	 deal	 with	 non-signatories	 in	 arbitration	 too.	 Some	
national	 courts	 and	 arbitration	 tribunals,	 albeit	 in	 exceptional	 only	
circumstances,	have	 lifted	 the	corporate	veil	of	 the	signatory	subsidiary	 to	 find	
that	 the	 non-signatory	 parent	 company	 is	 the	 true	 party	 to	 an	 arbitration	
agreement,	especially	if	the	subsidiary	is	insolvent	at	the	time	a	dispute	arises	or	
lacks	sufficient	funds	to	cover	the	damages	requested	by	the	claimant.21		
	
B. The	‘Group	of	Companies’	Doctrine	
	
In	 addition	 to	 contract	 and	 company	 law	 doctrines,	 a	 number	 of	 arbitration	
scholars	 in	 the	 1990s	 explored	 theoretical	 options	 to	 extend	 third-party	
mechanisms,	such	as	joinder	and	consolidation,	available	in	national	litigation	to	
international	 arbitration.22	While	 the	 debate	 about	 joinder	 and	 consolidation	
highlighted	some	important	analytical	 links	between	the	ability	of	 third	parties	
to	 participate	 in	 a	 litigation	 which	 implicates	 them	 and	 the	 need	 of	 non-
signatories	to	be	able	to	do	the	same	in	arbitration,	it	never	had	any	appeal	in	the	
practice	of	international	arbitration.				
	
Instead,	a	number	of	arbitration	tribunals	in	the	1980s	and	1990s	relied	on	
the	doctrine	of	group	of	companies	to	assume	jurisdiction	over	non-signatories	
in	disputes	involving	corporate	groups.	Although	some	awards	had	held	that	an	
arbitration	 agreement	 could	 be	 extended	 to	 non-signatory	 members	 of	 a	
corporate	 group	 since	 the	 1970s,23	the	 ‘group	 of	 companies’	 idea	 was	 first	
articulated	 by	 the	 celebrated	Dow	Chemical	 v	 Isover-Saint-Gobain	 award	 in	 the	
early	 1980s.24	Two	 subsidiaries	 of	 the	 Dow	 Chemical	 Company	 group	 entered	
into	two	separate	distribution	agreements	with	Boussois-Isolation,	whose	rights	
																																																								
18	By	 way	 of	 example,	 see	 Deloitte	Noraudit	 A/S	 v	Deloitte	Haskins	&	 Sells	 9F	 3d	 1060	 (2d	 Cir	
1993).	
19	International	Paper	v	Schwabedissen	Maschinen	&	Anlagen	Gmbh	206	F	3d	411	(4th	Cir	2000).		
20	P	Blumberg,	The	Law	of	Corporate	Groups:	Tort,	Contract,	and	Other	Common	Law	Problems	in	
the	Substantive	Law	of	Parent	and	Subsidiary	Corporations	(Little	Brown	1989)	105–6.	
21	See,	for	example,	Ad	hoc	award	of	1991,	(1992)	2	ASA	Bull	202.	
22		 B	 Hanotiau,	 Complex	 Arbitrations:	 Multiparty,	 Multicontract,	 Multi-issue,	 and	 Class	 Actions	
(Kluwer	2003)	
23	See	for	example	ICC	case	no	2138	of	1974,	in	Y	Derains	and	S	Jarvin	(eds),	ICC	Arbitral	Awards	
1974–85	(Kluwer,	1990).	
24	Interim	Award	of	23	September	1982,	ICC	Case	No.	4131,	Y.C.A.	Vol.	IX	(1984),	131	and	Clunet	
1983,	at	899	et	seq.	
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and	 obligations	 were	 subsequently	 assigned	 to	 Isover-Saint-Gobain.	 When	 a	
dispute	arose	out	of	the	distribution	agreements,	which	contained	a	provision	for	
arbitration	under	the	rules	of	the	International	Chamber	of	Commerce	(ICC),	the	
two	Dow	Chemical	subsidiaries	together	with	the	non-signatory	parent	company	
(Dow	 Chemical	 USA)	 and	 another	 non-signatory	 subsidiary	 (Dow	 Chemical	
France)	 initiated	arbitration	proceedings	against	 Isover-Saint-Gobain	 in	France.	
The	 respondent	 argued	 that	 the	 tribunal	 lacked	 jurisdiction	 over	 the	 non-
signatory	parties	(l’exception	d’incompétence),	and	that	the	non-signatory	claims	
were	non-admissible	(l’exception	d’irrecevabilité).		
	
The	 tribunal	 applied	 substantive	 rules	 of	 international	 commerce,	which	 –
according	to	the	tribunal-	included	the	‘group	of	companies’	doctrine,	and	found	
that	 it	had	 jurisdiction	not	only	over	 the	 two	signatories	but	also	over	 the	 two	
non-signatory	companies	of	 the	Dow	Chemical	 group	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 first,	 all	
claimants,	 including	 the	 non-signatories,	 were	 companies	 of	 the	 same	 group;	
second,	 the	 non-signatory	 companies	 had	 assumed	 an	 active	 role	 in	 the	
conclusion,	performance	and	termination	of	the	distribution	agreements,	which	
contained	 an	 arbitration	 clause;	 third,	 the	 factual	 circumstances	 of	 the	 case	
demonstrated	 common	 intention	 for	 arbitration	 between	 the	 claimants,	
including	the	non-signatories,	and	the	respondents.				
	
The	Dow	Chemical	award	marked	a	genuine	moment	of	progress	in	the	law	
of	 international	 arbitration,	 which	 came	 about	 because	 of	 the	 fortunate	
coincidence	of	two	circumstances:	first,	the	reformist	Nouveau	Code	of	Procédure	
Civile	 of	 1981	 that	 had	 introduced	 a	 progressive	 arbitration	 law	 in	 France,	
namely	the	seat	of	the	Dow	Chemical	arbitration.		
	
Second,	 the	 fact	 that	 the	Dow	 Chemical	 dispute	 was	 decided	 by	 a	 ‘strong’	
arbitration	 tribunal	 with	 intellectual	 confidence	 and	 distinct	 international	
outlook.	Professor	Pieter	Sanders,	who	was	chairing	the	Dow	Chemical	tribunal,	
and	 Professor	 Berthold	 Goldman	 who	 was	 sitting	 as	 a	 co-arbitrator	 were	
stalwarts	 of	 international	 law	 and	 international	 arbitration.	 Professor	 Sanders	
was	a	Dutch	lawyer	who	had	almost	singlehandedly	drafted	the	1976	UNCITRAL	
Arbitration	Rules	 and	 the	 1958	United	Nations	 Convention	 on	 the	Recognition	
and	Enforcement	of	Foreign	Arbitral	Awards,	which	went	on	 to	become	one	of	
the	 most	 successful	 international	 treaties	 and	 the	 cornerstone	 of	 modern	
international	 arbitration	 practice.	 Professor	 Goldman	 was	 a	 French	
comparativist	 who	 was	 behind	 a	 number	 of	 progressive	 developments	 in	
international	 law,	 such	 as	 the	 concept	 of	 international	 companies	 (société	
internationale)	 and	 the	 revival	 of	 lex	mercatoria	 and	 transnational	 substantive	
rules	in	the	1960s.	Having	a	unique	appreciation	of	the	international	settings	of	
arbitration	and	a	 strong	belief	 in	 the	 reformist	power	of	 international	 law,	 the	
Dow	 Chemical	 tribunal	 was	 able	 to	 conceptualize	 arbitration	 agreements	 in	
international	business	transactions	as	autonomous	and	independent	of	the	main	
contract,	 and	 subject	 only	 to	 transnational	 legal	 rules.	 Liberated	 from	 the	
constraints	 of	 national	 laws,	 an	 arbitration	 agreement	was	 thus	 able	 to	 bind	 a	
8	
	
non-signatory	party,	especially	if	this	party	was	implicated	in	the	performance	of	
the	underlying	contract.	In	the	words	of	the	Dow	Chemical	award:	25	
	
Considering,	 in	particular,	 that	 the	arbitration	clause	expressly	accepted	
by	certain	of	the	companies	of	the	group	should	bind	the	other	companies	
which,	by	virtue	of	their	role	in	the	conclusion,	performance,	or	termination	
of	the	contracts	containing	said	clauses,	and	in	accordance	with	the	mutual	
intention	of	all	parties	to	the	proceedings,	appear	to	have	been	veritable	
parties	 to	 these	 contracts	 or	 to	have	been	principally	 concerned	by	 them	
and	the	disputes	to	which	they	may	give	rise.	[emphasis	added]	
	
In	one	of	 the	most	progressive	 legal	 reasoning	 in	 international	commercial	
arbitration,	 the	Dow	Chemical	 tribunal	went	on	 to	emphasise	 that	 international	
arbitration	should	elaborate	rules	to	respond	to	‘economic	reality’	and	the	‘needs	
of	international	commerce’:26	
	
Considering	that	irrespective	of	the	distinct	juridical	identity	of	each	of	its	
members,	 a	 group	 of	 companies	 constitutes	 one	 and	 the	 same	 economic	
reality	 (une	 réalité	 économique	 unique)	 of	 which	 the	 arbitral	 tribunal	
should	take	account	when	it	rules	on	its	own	jurisdiction	[…]	
	
Considering	 that	 ICC	 arbitral	 tribunals	 have	 already	 pronounced	
themselves	 to	 this	 effect.	 The	 decisions	 of	 these	 tribunals	 progressively	
create	 caselaw	 which	 should	 be	 taken	 into	 account,	 because	 it	 draws	
conclusions	 from	 economic	 reality	 and	 conforms	 to	 the	 needs	 of	
international	commerce,	to	which	rules	specific	to	international	arbitration,	
themselves	successively	elaborated	should	respond.	[emphasis	added]	
	
Although	the	respondent,	predictably,	applied	to	the	French	courts	to	set	the	
award	aside,	the	Paris	Cour	d’appel	upheld	the	award	and	confirmed	jurisdiction	
of	the	tribunal	over	the	non-signatory	Dow	Chemical	companies.27		
	
Since	 the	Dow	Chemical	 award	a	number	of	 tribunals	applied	 the	 ‘group	of	
companies’	doctrine	to	assume	jurisdiction	over	non-signatories.28	Nevertheless,	
the	doctrine	never	actually	found	broad	acceptance	in	international	arbitration.	
Almost	every	arbitral	award	that	relied	on	the	‘group	of	companies’	doctrine	was	
issued	 by	 a	 tribunal	 sitting	 in	 France	 and	 deciding	 under	 the	 ICC	 Arbitration	
Rules.	 Arbitration	 tribunals	 and	 national	 courts	 outside	 France,	 especially	 in	
common	 law	 jurisdictions,	 never	 accepted	 the	 idea	 that	 separate	 legal	 entities	
can	be	treated	as	an	corporate	group,29	whether	for	substantive	or	jurisdictional	
purposes,	 and	 remained	 strictly	 adherent	 to	 the	 fundamental,	 if	 artificial,	
principle	of	separate	legal	personality	and	limited	liability.		
																																																								
25	Interim	Award	of	23	September	1982,	ICC	case	No.	4131,	above	(note	24).	
26	Ibid.	
27	Paris	Cour	d’Appel,	21	October	1983,	(1984)	Rev	Arb	98	with	note	Chapelle.	
28	ICC	Case	no	5103	of	1988,	 (1991)	2(2)	 ICC	Bull	20;	 ICC	Case	no	6519	of	1991,	 J	Arnaldez,	Y	
Derains,	and	D	Hascher	(eds),	ICC	Collection	of	Arbitral	Awards	1986–1990	(Kluwer,	1997)	420.	
29	See,	for	example,	the	landmark	decision	of	the	UK	House	of	Lords	in	Salomon	v	Salomon	[1896]	
UKHL	1.		
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III. THE	PROBLEM	WITH	THE	EXISTING	NON-SIGNATORY	THEORIES	
	
Despite	 the	 existence	 of	 such	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 non-signatory	 theories,	 the	
arguments	 about	non-signatories	persist	 and	pervade	 the	debates	 surrounding	
international	 arbitration.	 While	 the	 number	 of	 disputes	 involving	 non-
signatories	 has	 constantly	 increased	 in	 the	 last	 thirty	 years,30	commentators	
have	 observed	 that	 the	 ‘existing	 jurisprudence	 [on	 non-signatories]	 requires	
substantial	doctrinal	development’.31		
	
More	worrisome,	while	a	number	of	arbitral	institutions	have	amended	their	
rules	in	order	to	allow	the	participation	of	non-signatory	in	the	arbitration,32	an	
increasing	 number	 of	 awards	 dealing	with	 non-signatories	 has	 been	 either	 set	
aside	 or	 refused	 enforcement	 by	 national	 courts.33	Thirty	 years	 after	 the	Dow	
Chemical	award,	international	arbitration	seems	to	still	be	struggling	to	develop	
rules	 that	may	 respond	 to	 ‘the	needs	of	 international	 commerce’,	 at	 least,	with	
respect	to	non-signatories.	
	
There	 are	 three	 main	 problems	 with	 the	 existing	 non-signatory	 theories.	
First,	the	way	courts	and	tribunals	deal	with	non-signatories	reveals	a	confusing	
divide	 between	 rhetoric	 and	 actual	 practice,	 which	 essentially	 contravenes	
fundamental	principles	of	consent.	Secondly,	arbitration	law	on	non-signatories	
is	often	unable	to	accommodate	complex	commercial	reality.	Thirdly,	the	existing	
non-signatory	theories	have	been	largely	borrowed	from	contract	national	laws	
rather	than	been	specifically	developed	for	international	arbitration.		
	
These	 three	 issues	 and	 their	 implications	 for	 both	 arbitration	 theory	 and	
arbitration	practice	are	examined	in	turn.		
	
A. The	Divide	Between	Rhetoric	and	Actual	Practice	with	Respect	to	Non-
signatories	in	International	Commercial	Arbitration	
	
The	 existing	 theories	 on	 non-signatories	 are	 premised	 on	 the	 idea	 of	 implicit	
consent,	 namely	 the	 idea	 that	 a	 non-signatory	 can	 be	 bound	 by	 an	 arbitration	
agreement,	 if	 it	 has	 implicitly	 consented	 to	 it	 by	 conduct.	 National	 court	
decisions	and	international	arbitral	awards	abound	by	commonplace,	if	banal,34	
																																																								
30	For	example,	while	only	one	out	of	five	International	Chamber	of	Commerce	(ICC)	arbitrations	
involved	more	than	two	parties	in	1989	(International	Court	of	Arbitration	Bulletin,	(Volume	1,	
Number	 1),	 (1990),	 p.	 8)	 in	 2014	 one	 out	 of	 three	 ICC	 arbitrations	 involved	 more	 than	 two	
parties	(see	ICC	Dispute	Resolution	Bulletin,	(Issue	1,	2015),	p.	8).	
31	Martinez-	Fraga,	above	(note	1)	at	294.	
32	E.g.,	Articles	7-10	of	the	2011	Arbitration	Rules	of	 ICC,	Rule	24(1)(b)	of	the	2013	Arbitration	
Rules	 of	 the	 Singapore	 International	 Arbitration	 Centre	 and	 Articles	 7	 and	 8	 of	 the	 2014	
Arbitration	Rules	of	the	International	Centre	for	Dispute	Resolution.	
33	See	 for	 example,	 the	 decisions	 of	 the	 English	 Supreme	 Court	 in	 Dallah	 v	 Government	 of	
Pakistan,	[2010]	UKSC	46,	and	the	decision	of	the	English	High	Court	in	Peterson	Farms	Inc	v	C&M	
Farming	Ltd	 [2004]	1	Lloyd’s	Rep	603,	 the	decision	of	 the	Court	of	Singapore	 in	PT	First	Media	
TBK	 v	 Astro	Nusantara	 International	 BV	 and	 others	 [2013]	 SGCA	 57,	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 Swiss	
Federal	Tribunal,	Decision	4A_450/2013	on	7	April	2014.		
34	As	Alan	Rau	aptly	observes	in	‘Arbitral	Jurisdiction	and	the	Dimensions	of	“consent”’	(2008)	24	
Arbitration	International	199.	
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propositions	 to	 the	 effect	 that	 ‘arbitration	 is	 a	matter	 of	 contract	 and	 a	 party	
cannot	be	required	to	submit	to	arbitration	any	dispute	which	he	has	not	agreed	so	
to	submit’.35	
	
Even	 the	 ‘group	 of	 companies’	 doctrine,	 which	 originally	 arrived	 as	 a	
progressive	 theory	aiming	 to	 reconcile	 international	 arbitration	with	economic	
reality	 and	 the	needs	of	 international	 commerce,	never	 actually	departed	 from	
the	 idea	 of	 consent.	 Almost	 every	 arbitration	 award	 relying	 on	 the	 ‘ground	 of	
companies’	 doctrine	 has	 emphasised	 the	 need	 that	 signatories	 and	 non-
signatories	exhibit	‘common	intention’	to	arbitrate.36	
	
However,	while	national	courts	and	arbitration	tribunals	insist	that	whether	
a	non-signatory	is	bound	by	an	arbitration	agreement	is	a	matter	of	consent,	 in	
reality,	consent	for	arbitration	is	often	lacking	in	the	non-signatory	theories	they	
apply.	 Specifically,	 we	 can	 distinguish	 between	 two	 groups	 of	 non-signatory	
theories.	 In	 the	 first,	non-signatories	may	be	allowed	or	compelled	 to	arbitrate	
on	the	basis	of	equity,	not	consent	for	arbitration.	In	the	second,	non-signatories	
may	be	allowed	or	compelled	to	arbitrate	on	the	basis	of	a	functional	concept	of	
consent	 that	 concerns	 the	 underlying	 substantive	 contract,	 not	 the	 arbitration	
agreement.	 In	 either	 group,	 it	 is	 questionable	 whether	 consent	 for	 arbitration	
actually	exists.	
	
The	 first	 group	 includes	 the	 doctrines	 of	 apparent	 or	 ostensible	 authority,	
alter	ego,	 lifting	 the	corporate	veil	and	estoppel.	Each	one	of	 these	doctrines	 is	
based	 on	 equitable	 considerations.	 The	 doctrine	 of	 ostensible	 authority,	 for	
example,	is	premised	on	the	general	principle	of	prohibition	of	abuse	of	rights,37	
recognised	in	both	common	and	civil	 law	jurisdictions.	38	Similarly,	the	doctrine	
of	 arbitral	 estoppel	 reflects	 the	 general	 principle	 of	 non-venire	 contra	 factum	
proprium,	 found	 in	many	contemporary	 civil	 law	 jurisdictions	and	originally	 in	
Roman	law.39	
	
Under	these	doctrines,	the	non-signatory	party	is	compelled	to	arbitrate	not	
because	 it	 has	 actually	 agreed	 to	 arbitrate,	 but	 because	 it	would	 be	 unfair	 if	 it	
were	allowed	to	escape	arbitration.	It	would	be	unfair,	for	example,	if	a	State	were	
allowed	 to	 escape	 arbitration	 in	 circumstances	 where	 it	 has	 lead	 a	 party	 to	
reasonably	believe	 that	a	 state	entity	was	acting	with	authority	 to	 conclude	an	
arbitration	clause,	even	if	such	authority	is	actually	missing.	Equally,	it	would	be	
																																																								
35	United	Steelworkers	of	America	v.	Warrior	&	Gulf	Nav.	Co.,	363	U.S.	574,	582	(1960).	
36	See	for	example,	the	arbitral	award	in	ICC	case	no	4131	of	1982,	Dow	Chemical	v	Isover-Saint-
Gobain	(1984)	9	YBCA	131;	ICC	case	no	6000	of	1988,	(1991)	2(2)	ICC	Bull	34;	ICC	award,	on	10	
March	2003,	C&M	Farming	Ltd	v	Peterson	Farms	Inc	(unpublished).		
37	Cf	G	Born,	International	Commercial	Arbitration,	(Kluwer,	2014)	1425.	
38	In	England	see	R	Munday,	On	Agency	(Oxford	University	Press,	2010)	ch	4;	in	France	the	rule	
has	 been	 established	 since	 the	 19th	 century	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Cour	 de	 Cassation,	 16	 January	
1861,	Lizardi	v	Chaize,	Sirey,	Pt	I,	at	305	(1861);	in	the	US	see	Restatement	(Third)	Agency	para	
2.03	 (2006).	 Cf	 also	 UNIDROIT	 Principles	 of	 International	 Commercial	 Contracts	 Art	 2.2.5(2)	
(2004).	
39	E	Gaillard,	 ‘L’Interdiction	de	 se	 contredire	 au	 détriment	 d’autrui	 comme	principe	 général	 au	
droit	du	commerce	international’	(1985)	Rev	Arb	241;	See	also	Born,	above	(note	37)	p.	1471;	T	
Zuberbühler,	‘Non-Signatories	and	the	Consensus	to	Arbitrate’	(2008)	26(1)	ASA	Bull	30.	
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unfair	if	a	party,	which	seeks	to	enforce	a	substantive	right	under	a	contract	that	
contains	 an	 arbitration	 clause,	 were	 allowed	 to	 cherry-pick	 and	 enjoy	 the	
substantive	benefit	of	the	contract,	while	denying	the	arbitration	clause	therein.	
Finally,	it	would	be	unfair	if	an	individual	or	a	parent	company	were	allowed	to	
escape	 arbitration,	 by	 hiding	 behind	 the	 corporate	 veil	 of	 a	 wholly	 owned	
subsidiary	to	frustrate	the	interests	of	a	claimant	in	an	arbitration.		
	
Recently,	 the	 Swiss	 Federal	 Tribunal	 even	 relied	 on	 the	 principle	 of	 good	
faith	 to	 compel	 a	 non-signatory	 party	 to	 arbitrate.40	In	 this	 case,	 an	 arbitral	
tribunal	 sitting	 in	 Switzerland	 had	 denied	 jurisdiction	 over	 a	 non-signatory	
parent	company,	although	the	latter	was	involved	in	a	contract	that	contained	an	
arbitration	clause,	singed	by	its	subsidiary.	Setting	aside	the	arbitral	award,	the	
Swiss	Federal	Tribunal	noted	that	when	a	non-signatory	acts	 in	such	a	manner	
that	leads	someone	to	believe	that	it	is	a	true	party	to	a	contract,	the	principle	of	
good	 faith	 requires	 that	 the	 non-signatory	 party	 be	 bound	 by	 the	 arbitration	
clause	included	in	that	contract.	
	
Under	 all	 these	 doctrines,	 including	 the	 principle	 of	 good	 faith,	 arbitration	
tribunals	 and	 national	 courts	 have	 compelled	 non-signatories	 to	 arbitrate	
because	 of	 fundamental	 considerations	 of	 equity,	 not	 consent	 for	 arbitration.	
Arbitrators	 and	 arbitration	 practitioners	 are	 typically	 struck	 with	 horror	
whenever	 the	 question	 of	 equity	 arises	 in	 arbitration.	 Equity	 tends	 to	 conflict	
with	 our	 hard-wired	 positivistic	 instincts,	 and	 arbitrators	 are	 habitually	
reluctant	 to	 consider	 equitable	 arguments	 lest	 they	 are	 perceived	 to	 act	 as	
amiable	compositeurs	or	engaging	in	administration	of	justice.41	
	
Nonetheless,	 the	 main	 idea	 underlying	 all	 these	 non-signatory	 theories	 is	
equity,	 not	 consent	 for	 arbitration.	 As	 the	 Tribunal	 in	 the	 Westland	 case	
acknowledged	in	deciding	to	accept	jurisdiction	over	a	number	of	non-signatory	
States:	
	
[M]ention	must	 be	made	 of	 the	 practical	 reasons	 and	 considerations	 of	
equity	which	 have	motivated	 the	 arbitrators	 in	 this	matter,	 quite	 apart	
from	 the	 legal	 ground.	Westland	 is	 justified	 in	 bringing	 the	 four	 States	
themselves	before	the	arbitrators.	Were	this	not	the	case,	there	would	be	
a	 real	 denial	 of	 justice.	 In	 other	 words,	 Westland	 would	 not	 recover	
anything.42	
	
The	 second	 group	 includes	 the	 doctrines	 of	 assignment,	 third-party	
beneficiary	 and	 implied	 consent	 including	 the	 ‘group	 of	 companies’	 doctrine.	
These	doctrines	 are	premised	on	a	notion	of	 constructive	 consent	 that	 aims	at	
the	underlying	substantive	contract,	not	the	arbitration	agreement.	While	a	form	
of	consent	exists	in	these	cases,	it	is	not	consent	for	arbitration.			
																																																								
40	Swiss	Federal	Tribunal,	Decision	4A_450/2013	dated	7	April	2014.	See	also	older	decision	of	the	
Swiss	Federal	Tribunal	 in	Compagnie	de	Navigation	et	Transp.	SA	v.	Mediterranean	Shipping	Co.,	
XXI	Y.B.	Comm.	Arb.	690,	698,	16	January	1995.	
41	Bernard	Hanotiau,	‘Consent	to	Arbitration:	Do	We	Share	a	Common	Vision?’	(2011)	Arbitration	
International	(4)27,	541.	
42	ICC	interim	award	of	5	March	1984	in	case	No	3879,	11	Y.B.	Com.	Arb.	127	(1986).	
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For	example,	in	most	jurisdictions	it	is	accepted	that	a	third	party	beneficiary	
who	 enjoys	 the	 benefit	 of	 a	 substantive	 clause	 in	 a	 contract,	 may	 also	 benefit	
from	 the	arbitration	clause	 in	 that	 contract,	 even	 if	 the	original	parties	did	not	
specifically	 agree	 to	 pass	 on	 the	 benefit	 of	 the	 arbitration	 clause	 to	 the	 third	
party.43	Proof	 that	 the	 original	 parties	 agreed	 to	 provide	 a	 third	 party	 with	 a	
substantive	 benefit	 generally	 suffices	 for	 the	 beneficiary	 to	 enforce	 its	
substantive	 benefit	 through	 arbitration.	 Similarly,	 the	 rule	 that	 an	 arbitration	
agreement	is	automatically	transferred	when	the	underlying	contract	is	assigned	
does	 not	 require	 proof	 that	 the	 assignee	 has	 specifically	 consented	 for	 the	
assignment	 of	 the	 arbitration	 clause.	 Consent	 for	 the	 assignment	 of	 the	
substantive	 right	 is	 typically	 sufficient	 for	 the	 assignee	 to	 bring	 a	 claim	 in	
arbitration.44	
	
Further,	in	applying	the	‘group	of	companies’	doctrine,	arbitration	tribunals	
often	rely	on	circumstances	surrounding	the	underlying	substantive	contract	or	
transaction	(not	 the	arbitration	agreement)	 to	 infer	consent	 for	arbitration.	On	
several	occasions,	arbitration	tribunals	have	found	that	an	active	involvement	of	
a	non-signatory	company	in	the	performance	of	 the	underlying	contract	can	be	
taken	 as	 evidence	 of	 consent	 for	 arbitration.45	In	 these	 cases,	 it	 is	 the	 non-
signatory’s	 acquiescence	 to	 deliver	 goods	 or	 perform	 part	 of	 the	 substantive	
contract,	rather	than	the	non-signatory’s	implied	consent	for	arbitration,	that	has	
empowered	tribunals	to	accept	the	non-signatory	in	arbitration.46	
	
This	 broad	 concept	 of	 constructive	 consent,	 used	 by	 national	 courts	 and	
arbitration	 tribunals	 as	 a	 proxy	 of	 consent	 for	 arbitration,	 rests	 upon	 the	
assumption	 that	 an	 arbitration	 agreement	 which	 already	 exists	 requires	 ‘less	
consent’	 or	 at	 least	 ‘less	 evidence	of	 consent’	 to	 bind	 a	non-signatory	 than	 the	
original	signatories.47	This	is	why	it	is	generally	accepted	that,	while	consent	for	
arbitration	must	be	evidenced	in	writing	when	two	signatories	first	enter	into	an	
arbitration	 agreement,	 proof	 of	 consent	 in	 writing	 is	 not	 needed	 for	 non-
signatories	that	are	subsequently	added	to	an	existing	arbitration	agreement.48			
	
French	courts	have	taken	the	argument	for	diminished	arbitration	consent	a	
step	 further	 and	 have	 found	 that	 even	mere	 awareness	 of	 the	 existence	 of	 an	
arbitration	 clause	 in	 an	 international	 contract	 may	 be	 sufficient	 for	 a	 non-
																																																								
43	See	above	(note	15).	
44	See	above	(notes	9-14).	
45	See	for	example,	ICC	case	no	5103	of	1988	(1991)	2(2)	ICC	Bull	20	Soci.t.	Sponsor	AB	v	Lestrade	
(Cour	d’Appel	Paris	(1988)	Rev	Arb	154,	with	note	A	Chapelle).	See	also	the	Dow	Chemical	award,	
above	(note	24),	and	ICC	case	no	6000	of	1988,	(1991)	2(2)	ICC	Bull	32.	
46	See	Hanotiau	 above	 (note	 41),	 p.	 539	 ‘this	 type	 of	 analysis	 is	wrongly	 used	 as	 a	 shortcut	 to	
avoid	 legal	 reasoning	 and	 as	 such	 has	 contributed	 to	 a	 distorted	 approach	 by	 courts	 and	
arbitrators	in	a	number	of	complex	arbitrations’	and	Born,	above	(note	37),	p.	1429.		
47	This	 is	especially	 the	case	when	 tribunals	and	courts	are	examining	whether	a	signatory	has	
consented	to	arbitrate	with	a	non-signatory.	See	Rau,	above	(note	34).		
48	See	the	passage	often	cited	in	US	cases	in	Fisser	v	International	Bank	282	F	2d	231,	233	(2d	Cir	
1960):	 ‘It	 does	 not	 follow,	 however,	 that	 under	 the	 [Federal	 Arbitration]	 Act	 an	 obligation	 to	
arbitrate	attaches	only	to	one	who	has	personally	signed	the	written	arbitration	provision.’		
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signatory	party	 to	be	 compelled	 to	 arbitrate.	 For	 example,	 the	Cour	d’Appel	 of	
Paris	in	Korsnas	Marma	v	Durand-Auzias	noted:	
	
[A]n	 arbitration	 clause	 included	 in	 an	 international	 contract	 has	 an	
autonomous	 validity	 and	 effectiveness,	 which	 calls	 for	 the	 clause	 to	 be	
extended	 to	parties	directly	 involved	 in	 the	performance	of	 the	contract	
and	 in	 the	 disputes	 arising	 out	 of	 the	 contract,	 provided	 that	 it	 is	
established	 that	 their	 activities	 raise	 the	 presumption	 that	 they	 were	
aware	of	the	existence	and	the	scope	of	the	arbitration	clause,	irrespective	
of	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 did	 not	 sign	 the	 contract	 including	 the	 arbitration	
agreement.49	(emphasis	added)		
	
It	must	 be	 questioned	whether	 this	 approach	 to	 arbitration	 agreements	 is	
reconciled	 with	 fundamental	 principles	 of	 consent.	 An	 arbitration	 agreement	
cannot	bind	a	third	party	merely	because	it	exists	between	two	other	parties,	or	
merely	because	a	third	party	is	aware	of	its	existence.50	Fundamental	principles	
of	contract	law	entail	that	the	same	amount	of	consent	and	evidence	of	consent	
are	required	for	a	non-signatory	to	be	bound	by	an	arbitration	agreement	as	by	
any	ordinary	 contract.51	Consent	 for	 arbitration	 is	 a	matter	of	 kind	not	degree,	
and	 there	 is	 no	 national	 arbitration	 law	 or	 arbitration	 treaty	 providing	 that	
arbitration	clauses	require	less	consent	or	less	evidence	of	consent.	
	
In	 essence,	 in	 cases	 involving	 non-signatories,	 national	 courts	 and	
arbitration	 tribunals	 have	 realised	 that	 in	 commercial	 reality	 it	 is	 not	 always	
possible	for	businesspeople	to	consent	to	every	term	of	a	transaction,	including	
an	arbitration	clause.	This	 realisation	has	 forced	 them	 to	develop	 legal	 fictions	
that	 have	 expanded	 the	 scope	 of	 consent	 for	 arbitration	 far	 beyond	 what	 the	
parties	 ever	 had	 in	mind.	However,	 the	 use	 of	 proxies	 (such	 as	 the	 fact	 that	 a	
non-signatory	 participates	 in	 the	 main	 contract	 or	 that	 it	 is	 aware	 of	 the	
existence	of	an	arbitration	agreement)	 to	 ‘demonstrate’	 consent	 for	arbitration	
runs	afoul	with	the	very	idea	of	consent,	as	a	conscious	and	informed	decision	of	
an	individual	to	abide	by	an	unequivocal	promise.52		
	
It	 becomes	 apparent	 thus	 that	 a	 clear	 divide	 between	 rhetoric	 and	 actual	
practice	 exists	 in	 respect	 of	 non-signatories	 in	 international	 commercial	
																																																								
49	Cour	d’Appel,	Paris,	30	November	1988,	Korsnas	Marma	v	Durand-Auzias,	(1989)	Rev	Arb	691,	
at	 694	 with	 note	 P-Y	 Tschanz;	 Cour	 d’Appel,	 Paris,	 11	 January	 1990,	 Orri	 v	 Lubrifiants	 Elf	
Aquitaine,	(1992)	Rev	Arb	95,	with	note	D	Cohen;	(1991)	118	JDI	141,	with	note	B	Audit;	Cour	de	
Cassation,	 27	March	 2007,	Alcatel	Business	 Systems,	Alcatel	Micro	Electronics	 and	AGF	 v	Amkor	
Technology	et	al,	Cass	1e	civ,	[2007]	11	JCP	I	168,	with	note	C	Seraglini.	
50	See	D	Cohen,	 note	 in	 Cour	de	Cassation,	 5	 January	1999,	 and	Cour	de	Cassation,	 19	October	
1999,	(2000)	Rev	Arb	92,	noting	that	 ‘the	validity	of	a	contract	does	not	entail	 the	extension	of	
this	 contract,	 and,	 thus,	 arbitration	 agreements	 cannot	 contravene	 the	 general	 principles	 of	
contract	law	in	this	regard’.	Cf	also	Thomson-CSF	v	American	Arbitration	Ass’n	64	F	3d	773	(2d	Cir	
1995)	779,	at	780.	
51	See	Williston	on	Contracts,	(4th	edn	WestGroup,	2001)	para	57:1.	
52	Cf	Richard	Frankel	“The	Arbitration	Clause	As	Super	Contract”,	91	Wash.	U.	L.	Rev.	2013-2014,	
531,	arguing	that	“the	judiciary's	inappropriate	reliance	on	the	federal	policy	favoring	arbitration	
distorts	state	contract	law	to	push	cases	into	arbitration	that	do	not	belong	there”.	
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arbitration. 53 	Whereas	 in	 theory	 national	 courts	 and	 tribunals	 defend	 the	
extension	of	 arbitration	agreements	 to	non-signatories	on	 consensual	 grounds,	
in	 reality	 the	 non-signatory	 theories	 they	 apply	 are	 alien	 to	 fundamental	
principles	of	consent.	Indeed,	the	concept	of	consent	for	arbitration,	employed	by	
national	courts	and	tribunals,	is	markedly	different	from	the	concept	of	consent	
normally	used	for	ordinary	contracts.54	While	it	is	possible	that	this	divide	is	the	
result	 of	 a	 genuine	misunderstanding	 of	 contract	 law,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 it	 is	 the	
result	of	a	general	policy	favouring	the	enforcement	of	international	arbitration	
agreements.55	While	such	a	pro-arbitration	policy	may	be	sound,	 its	consensual	
justifications	are	often	indefensible.		
	
In	 all	 events,	 this	 divide	 has	 been	 spectacularly	 exposed	 in	 a	 number	 of	
cases,	 including	the	well-known	Dallah	v	Government	of	Pakistan,	where	the	UK	
Supreme	 Court	 and	 the	 French	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 in	 Paris,	 two	 very	 prominent	
national	 judiciaries,	 reached	 diametrically	 opposing	 decisions	 on	 the	 issue	 of	
implied	consent	and	non-signatories.	
	
In	 this	 case,	 the	 Government	 of	 Pakistan	 entered	 into	 a	 Memorandum	 of	
Understanding	with	 Dallah,	 a	 Saudi	 Arabian	 construction	 company,	 to	 provide	
housing	 in	 Saudi	Arabia	 for	 Pakistani	 pilgrims	 to	Mecca.	 Following	 a	 period	 of	
negotiations	 between	 Dallah	 and	 Pakistani	 Government	 ministers,	 the	
Government	of	Pakistan	 set	up	a	Trust	 to	enter	 into	an	agreement	with	Dallah	
(the	 ‘Agreement’).	 The	 Agreement	 contained	 the	 terms	 (including	 an	 ICC	
arbitration	clause	for	Paris)	that	were	previously	negotiated	by	the	Government.	
Although	it	was	not	a	signatory	to	either	the	Agreement	or	the	arbitration	clause,	
the	 Government	 of	 Pakistan,	 including	 certain	members	 of	 it,	 became	 actively	
implicated	 in	 the	 performance	 and	 management	 of	 the	 construction	 project.	
When	a	dispute	arose	out	of	the	Agreement,	the	Trust	ceased	to	exist.	Faced	with	
the	rather	unappealing	prospect	of	bringing	a	claim	against	 the	Government	of	
Pakistan	 before	 the	 Pakistani	 Courts,	 Dallah	 decided	 to	 commence	 arbitration	
proceedings	in	Paris	against	the	non-signatory	Government.	While	the	tribunal,	
sitting	 in	 Paris,	 accepted	 jurisdiction	 over	 the	 Government,	 the	 UK	 Supreme	
Court	refused	to	enforce	the	award	on	the	grounds	that	the	Government	was	not	
a	party	to	either	the	Agreement	or	the	arbitration	clause.	
	
The	UK	 Supreme	Court	was	 rather	 unimpressed	 by	 the	 tribunal’s	 decision	
that	 the	 non-signatory	 Government	 of	 Pakistan	 had	 implicitly	 consented	 to	
arbitration	on	the	basis	that	it	was	a	party	to	the	Memorandum	of	Understanding	
																																																								
53 	Lawrence	 Cunningham,	 ‘Rhetoric	 Versus	 Reality	 in	 Arbitration	 Jurisprudence:	 How	 the	
Supreme	Court	Flaunts	and	Flunks	Contracts’,	(2012)	129	Law	and	Contemporary	Problems	135.	
54	See	in	more	detail	Frankel,	above	(note	52).	
55	E.g.	 US	 Supreme	 Court	 decision	 in	Moses	H.	 Cone	Memorial	 Hospital	 v.	Mercury	 Construction	
Corp.,	460	 U.S.	 1	 (1983):	 ‘it	 is	 a	 congressional	 declaration	 of	 a	 liberal	 federal	 policy	 favoring	
arbitration	 agreements,	 notwithstanding	 any	 state	 .	 .	 .	 policies	 to	 the	 contrary’	 and	Mitsubishi	
Motors	Corp.	v.	Soler	Chrysler-Plymouth,	 Inc.,	473	U.S.	 	614,	631	(1985)	holding	that	the	 in	the	
context	of	 international	 commercial	 transactions	 there	 is	 a	 “emphatic	 federal	policy”	 favouring	
arbitration.	See	also	in	England	Westacre	Investments	Inc.	v.	Jugoimport-Spdr	Holding	co.	Ltd.	and	
others,	[2000]	Q.B.	288	at	304.	See	also	Aubrey	Thomas,	“Non-Signatories	in	Arbitration:	a	Good	
Faith	Analysis”	14	Lewis	&	Clark	L.	Rev.	2010,	953.	
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and	was	implicated	in	the	performance	of	the	Agreement,	including	providing	a	
guarantee	in	favour	of	the	Trust.	Lord	Collins	noted:	
	
There	was	no	material	 sufficient	 to	 justify	 the	 tribunal’s	 conclusion	 that	
the	 Government’s	 behaviour	 showed	 and	 proved	 that	 the	 Government	
had	always	been	[…]	a	true	party	to	the	Agreement	and	therefore	to	the	
arbitration	agreement.	On	the	contrary,	[…]	on	the	face	of	the	Agreement	
the	parties	and	the	signatories	were	Dallah	and	the	Trust.	The	arbitration	
clause	related	to	disputes	between	the	Trust	and	Dallah.56	
	
By	contrast,	the	French	Court	of	Appeal,	which	issued	its	decision	only	a	few	
months	 after	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 UK	 Supreme	 Court,	 found	 that	 the	 factual	
circumstances	 surrounding	 the	 Agreement	 provided	 comprehensive	 evidence	
that	may	be	 relied	 upon	 to	 conclude	 that	 the	Government	 of	 Pakistan	was	 the	
true	party	to	the	Agreement	and	the	arbitration	clause	therein.	The	French	court	
noted:	
	
[The	 Government]	 behaved	 as	 if	 the	 Contract	 was	 its	 own;	 [...]	 this	
involvement	 of	 [the	 Government],	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 evidence	 that	 the	
Trust	 took	 any	 actions,	 as	well	 as	 [the	Government's]	 behaviour	 during	
the	pre-contractual	negotiations,	confirm	that	the	creation	of	the	Trust	was	
purely	 formal	 and	 that	 [the	 Government]	 was	 in	 fact	 the	 true	 Pakistani	
party	in	the	course	of	the	economic	transaction.57	(emphasis	added)	
	
It	 is	 reassuring	 to	 think	 that	 the	 two	 distinguished	 courts	 had	 merely	
different	 views	 on	 the	 facts	 of	 the	 case.58	The	 truth	 of	 the	 matter	 is	 that	 the	
conflicting	decisions	in	the	Dallah	case	highlights	two	more	fundamental	 issues	
in	 international	 commercial	 arbitration:	 first,	 the	 deficiencies	 of	 the	 all-
encompassing	 concept	 of	 constructive	 consent	 currently	 used	 for	 arbitration	
agreements.	 Second,	 the	 lack	 of	 a	 coherent	 approach	 to	 non-signatories	 under	
the	existing	theories.			
	
B. The	 Existing	 Non-signatory	 Theories	 are	 Often	 Unable	 to	
Accommodate	Complex	Commercial	Reality		
	
In	addition	to	being	incoherent	and	partly	in	conflict	with	fundamental	principles	
of	consent,	the	current	approach	to	non-signatories	exhibits	important	practical	
deficiencies.	 While	 the	 existing	 non-signatory	 theories	 can	 work	 well	 in	
straightforward	circumstances,	they	are	often	unable	to	offer	solutions	in	more	
sophisticated	 cases	 of	 multiparty	 transactions,	 such	 as	 in	 transactions	 with	
multinational	groups	and	state	entities.		
	
																																																								
56	Lord	Collins	in	Dallah	v	Government	of	Pakistan,	[2010]	UKSC	46,	para	145.	
57	See	 decision	 of	 17	 February	 2011,	 in	Gouvernement	 du	 Pakistan	 –	 Ministère	 des	 Affaires	
Religieuses	v.	Dallah	Real	Estate	and	Tourism	Holding	Company	(Case	No.	09/28533).		
58	Cf	also	Arsanovia	Ltd.	&		Ors	v.	Cruz	City	I		Mauritius	Holdings	[2012]	EWHC	
	(Comm)	 3702,	 [35]	 holding	 that	 “English	 law	 requires	 that	 an	 intention	 to	 enter	 into	 an	
arbitration	clause	must	be	clearly	shown	and	is	not	readily	inferred”.			
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It	is	common	practice,	for	example,	for	a	State	or	a	parent	company	to	set	up	
a	state	entity	or	a	subsidiary	to	sign	a	contract,	 including	an	arbitration	clause,	
which	 the	 State	 and	 the	 parent	 company	 negotiate	 in	 the	 first	 place	 and	
subsequently	manage	 from	 the	 background.59	However,	 when	 the	 State	 or	 the	
parent	 company	does	not	 actually	 sign	 the	 contract	 and	 the	 arbitration	 clause,	
the	 existing	non-signatory	 theories	will	 often	be	 unable	 to	 assist	 a	 claimant	 to	
bring	 the	 State	 or	 the	 parent	 company	 before	 a	 tribunal,	 irrespective	 of	 how	
strongly	they	may	be	implicated	in	the	commercial	side	of	the	transaction.		
	
Indeed,	 if	 the	 State	 or	 the	 parent	 company	 is	 careful	 enough	 (as	 they	
normally	 are)	 to	 avoid	 any	 explicit	 declaration	 of	 acceptance	 of	 transactions	
conducted	by	state	entities	or	subsidiaries,	there	will	be	no	formal	authorization	
to	engage	principles	of	agency	law.	Any	effort	to	bind	the	non-signatory	State	or	
the	parent	company	to	an	arbitration	agreement	on	the	basis	of	representation	
will	fail.		
	
Equally,	transactions	with	state	entities	and	corporate	groups	will	often	fall	
outside	the	scope	of	provisions	on	third-party	beneficiary	and	assignment	law.	A	
non-signatory	 State	 or	 a	 parent	 company	will	 not	 normally	 qualify	 as	 a	 third-
party	 beneficiary	 unless	 there	 is	 express	wording	 to	 that	 effect,	 which	will	 be	
normally	missing.60	If	there	is	no	evidence	that	a	state	entity	or	a	subsidiary	and	
another	 party	 have	 agreed	 to	 assign	 or	 confer	 a	 substantive	 benefit	 of	 their	
contract	to	the	State	or	the	parent	company,	there	will	be	no	basis	to	argue	that	
the	latter	can	be	compelled	to	arbitrate.	
	
Similarly,	 while	 equitable	 doctrines,	 such	 the	 doctrines	 of	 apparent	
authority,	 good	 faith,	 alter	 ego	 and	 equitable	 estoppel,	 have	 to	 some	 extent	
advanced	 arbitration	 law	 beyond	 its	 contractual	 origins,	 they	 too	 exhibit	 clear	
conceptual	 and	 practical	 limitations.	 Being	 equitable	 in	 nature,	 their	 main	
function	is	to	correct	flagrant	aberrations	resulting	from	the	strict	application	of	
legal	 constructs,	 such	 as	 the	 doctrine	 of	 limited	 liability	 or	 separate	 legal	
personality.61	As	 a	 result,	 these	 equitable	 doctrines	 are	 designed	 to	 apply	 in	
extraordinary	 circumstances,	 not	 in	 ordinary	 business	 transactions	 which	
nowadays	tend	to	be	multifaceted	and	multiparty.		
	
For	example,	 the	doctrine	of	 lifting	 the	corporate	veil	has	very	 rarely	been	
accepted	 by	 national	 courts	 and	 arbitration	 tribunals	 and	 only	 on	 the	 basis	 of	
stringent	requirements,	such	as	that	a	parent	company	has	fraudulently	used	the	
corporate	 structure	 with	 the	 purpose	 of	 avoiding	 liability	 and	 defeating	 the	
interests	of	the	claimant.	This	type	of	circumstances	is	rare	and	difficult	to	prove	
in	practice.62		
	
Further,	 national	 courts	 and	 arbitration	 tribunals	 are	 characteristically	
reluctant	 to	 apply	 theories	 of	 apparent	 authority	 to	 compel	 a	 non-signatory	 to	
																																																								
59	P	Blumberg,	‘Limited	Liability	and	Corporate	Groups’	(1986)	11	Journal	of	Corporate	Law	574.	
60	See	Fortress	Value	Recovery	Fund	I	LLC	&	Ors	v.	Blue	Skye	Special	Opportunities	Fund	LP	&	Ors	
[2013]	EWCA	Civ	367.	
61	Martinez	Fraga,	above	(note	1),	p.	314.	
62	See	Service	Iron	Foundry,	Inc	v	MA	Bell	Co	588	P	2d	463,	473	(Kan	Ct	App	1978).	
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arbitration.	 For	 example,	 in	 the	Bridas	 v	Government	of	Turkmenistan,63	the	 US	
Fifth	Circuit	did	not	accept	that	the	Government	of	Turkmenistan	was	bound	as	
an	 apparent	 principal	 by	 an	 arbitration	 clause	 signed	 by	 Turkmenneft	 (an	
instrumentality	 formed	 and	 owned	 by	 the	 government	 of	 Turkmenistan).	 The	
Court	 found	 that	 while	 the	 government	 of	 Turkmenistan	 had	 made	 false	
representations	to	the	effect	that	Turkmenneft	was	acting	as	its	agent,	it	was	not	
reasonable	for	Bridas	to	rely	on	such	representations.	The	Court	noted:	
	
Had	Bridas	truly	felt	that	Turkmenneft	was	signing	the	agreement	not	for	
itself	but	on	behalf	of	the	Government,	it	had	the	obligation	to	make	that	
fact	 clear	 on	 the	 face	 of	 the	 agreement.	 This	 could	 have	 been	
accomplished	 in	a	myriad	of	ways.	Bridas	could	have	requested	that	 the	
Government	 sign	 the	 agreement,	 or	 inserted	 a	 prominent	 and	 direct	
statement	as	to	Turkmenneft’s	status.	
	
Finally,	despite	its	progressive	character,	or	possibly	because	of	it,	the	‘group	
of	 companies’	 doctrine	 has	 had	 a	 diminished	 relevance	 in	 arbitration	 practice	
since	 the	 1990s.	 As	 already	 mentioned,	 very	 few	 arbitration	 tribunals,	 and	
certainly	 none	 outside	 France,	 have	 been	 willing	 to	 apply	 the	 doctrine	 lately,	
while	a	number	of	commentators	have	strongly	opposed	it.64	
	
As	 a	 result,	 while	 international	 business	 transactions	 have	 increasingly	
become	 multifaceted,	 multiparty	 and	 multi-contract,	 international	 arbitration	
has	been	blissfully	resting	on	a	group	of	disparate	non-signatory	theories,	with	a	
narrow	scope	or	stringer	requirements	of	application.	As	a	result,	arbitration	has	
often	been	unable	 to	 accommodate	 the	 realities	 of	 international	 contemporary	
commerce.	 Importantly,	 whenever	 an	 arbitration	 tribunal	 attempted	 to	
emphasise	 commercial	 practices	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 doctrine,	 it	 came	 to	 regret	
such	attempt.	
	
For	 example,	 in	 C&M	 v	 Peterson	 Farms, 65 	the	 claimant	 commenced	
arbitration	 proceedings	 claiming	 damages	 suffered	 by	 the	 C&M	 group	 of	
companies	as	a	whole,	including	members	of	the	group	which	had	not	signed	the	
sales	 agreement	 and	 the	 arbitration	 clause	 therein.	 The	 arbitration	 tribunal	
sitting	in	London	found	that	it	had	jurisdiction	to	deal	with	damages	which	were	
suffered	not	only	by	the	signatory	claimant	(the	C&M	parent	company),	but	also	
the	non-signatory	C&M	companies.	Although	the	arbitrators	found	that	the	non-
signatory	C&M	companies	were	strongly	implicated	in	the	commercial	side	of	the	
sales	transaction,	and	that	in	reality	the	respondent	had	been	dealing	with	C&M	
as	a	group,	the	High	Court	of	England	set	the	award	aside	on	the	basis	that	the	
																																																								
63	Bridas	 SAPIC,	 Bridas	 Energy	 International	 Ltd,	 Intercontinental	 Oil	 and	 Gas	 Ventures	 Ltd	 and	
Bridas	Corporation	v	Government	of	Turkmenistan	and	State	Concern	Tukmenneft,	 345	 F.3d	 347	
(5th	Cir	2003).	
64	Hanotiau,	‘Consent	to	Arbitration’,	above	(note	41),	p.	546;	Stephan	Wilske,	Laurence	Shore	&	
Jan-Michael	 Ahrens	 ‘The	 ‘Group	 Of	 Companies	 Doctrine’	 —	 Where	 Is	 It	 Heading?’	 (2006)	 17	
American	Review	of	International	Arbitration	73.					
65	ICC	award,	on	10	March	2003,	C&M	Farming	Ltd	v	Peterson	Farms	Inc	(unpublished).	
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non-signatory	C&M	companies	had	not	actually	signed	the	arbitration	agreement	
in	the	main	contract.66			
	
Whilst	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 High	 Court	 is	 plausible	 and	 consistent	 with	
arbitration	 doctrine,	 it	 appears	 to	 be	 in	 tension	 with	 commercial	 practices	
concerning	transactions	with	multinational	groups.	Adopting	a	corporate	group	
structure	can	be	an	effective	mode	of	corporate	organisation	and	operation	that	
allows	multinationals	 to	 rationalise	 the	division	of	 tasks	 and	 labour	within	 the	
group.	If	such	a	corporate	structure	makes	good	commercial	sense,	why	should	a	
parent	 company	 be	 unable	 to	 bring	 a	 claim	 in	 arbitration	 requesting	 damages	
suffered	by	the	group	as	a	whole?		
	
Without	 a	 general	 theory	 that	 is	 the	 functional	 equivalent	 of	 the	 ‘group	 of	
companies’	 doctrine,	 arbitration	 law	 is	 unable	 to	 address	 a	 wide	 number	 of	
multiparty	transactions,	especially	relational	transactions	that	run	over	a	period	
of	 time,	 such	 as	 joint	 ventures,	 construction	 projects,	 franchises,	 concession	
contracts,	 financing	 agreements,	 licence	 agreements	 and	 long-term	 supply	
contracts.	 These	 relational	 agreements	 tend	 to	 develop	 in	 ways	 that	 often	 go	
beyond	 the	 four	 corners	 of	 the	 contract	 concluded	 at	 the	 very	 beginning	 of	 a	
long-term	project.	In	this	type	of	transactions,	non-signatories,	who	for	a	number	
of	 commercial	 reasons	 are	 not	 part	 of	 the	 contract	 in	 the	 first	 place,	 often	
become	 involved	 in	 the	 actual	 project	 as	 this	 develops	 in	 time.	 If	 subsequent	
involvement	of	non-signatories	in	the	commercial	side	of	a	project	is	disregarded	
for	the	purposes	of	arbitration	(as	many	tribunals	and	national	courts	tend	to	do	
nowadays),67	international	arbitration	will	become	irrelevant	to	a	wide	number	
of	complex	relational	transactions.68	
	
C. The	 Unwarranted	 Identification	 Between	 Contract	 and	 Arbitration	
Law		
	
To	 a	 large	 extent,	 the	 issues	 surrounding	 arbitration	 law	 on	 non-signatories	
reflect	the	challenges	for	contract	law	to	respond	to	the	inadequacies	of	classical	
contract	 law	 theories	 and	move	 towards	more	 relational	 norms	 not	 limited	 to	
implied	consent	or	consent	by	conduct.	
	
While	 in	 the	 19th	 century	 the	 primary	 paradigm	 of	 contract	 law	 was	
underpinned	by	consensual	theories	and	was	based	on	an	exchange	of	promise,	
in	 the	 course	 of	 the	 20th	 century	 a	 number	 of	 theorists	 exposed	 the	 artificial	
formality	 of	 the	 promise-based	 idea	 of	 contract,	 and	 developed	 normative	
accounts	 that	 moderate	 the	 role	 of	 consent. 69 	Either	 because	 of	 relational	
																																																								
66	Peterson	Farms	Inc	v	C&M	Farming	Ltd	[2004]	1	Lloyd’s	Rep	603.	
67	See	for	example,	Award	in	ICC	Case	No.	6673,	in	J.-J.	Arnaldez,	Y.	Derains	&	D.	Hascher	(eds.),	
Collection	 of	 ICC	 Arbitral	 Awards	 1991-1995	 429	 (1997);	 Award	 in	 Geneva	 Chamber	 of	
Commerce	of	24	March	2000,	21	ASA	Bull.	781	(2003).	
68	As	 a	 result	 businesspersons	may	 consider	 resorting	 to	 litigation	 for	multiparty	 transactions	
especially	national	courts	with	reputation	in	the	resolution	of	international	commercial	disputes	
such	 as	 the	 English	 High	 Court	 or	 the	 newly	 established	 Singapore	 International	 Commercial	
Court.		
69	See	Luke	Nottage,	 ‘Tracing	Trajectories	 in	Contract	Law	Theory:	Form	in	Anglo-New	Zealand	
Law,	Substance	in	Japan	and	the	United	States,’	(2013)	4	(2)	Yonsei	Law	Journal	175.	
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theories,	 emphasising	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 contextual	 matters	 surrounding	 a	
contract,70	or	because	of	theories	focusing	on	benefit	or	reliance	as	the	primary	
justification	 for	 contractual	 obligations	 and	 liabilities,71	contract	 law	 theory	 of	
the	20th	century	conceptualised	contractual	paradigms	that	transcend	consent.	
	
It	is	important	to	note	that	post-consent	theories	of	contract	law	developed	
to	 provide	 a	 more	 persuasive	 explanation	 than	 the	 classical	 and	 neoclassical	
theories	on	consent	as	to	how	contracts	actually	work	in	contemporary	business	
transactions.72 	For	 example,	 the	 notion	 of	 an	 instant	 exchange	 of	 promise	
between	two	commercial	parties	for	future	performance	as	a	distinct	obligation	
from	 the	 actual	 transaction	 became	 increasingly	 difficult	 to	 reconcile	with	 the	
realities	of	long-term	business	relationships.73	Equally,	the	notion	that	an	instant	
exchange	of	promises	must	be	demonstrated	in	a	ceremonial	fashion	and	by	way	
of	 signature,	 seal	 or	 any	 other	 form	 of	 deed	 of	 execution	 was	 too	 artificial	 to	
capture	 the	 informal	 and	 flexible	 manner	 in	 which	 international	 commerce	 is	
conducted.	 	 Thus,	 new	 insights	 in	 contract	 law	 emphasised	 the	 need	 to	 take	
account	 of	 the	 actual	 context	 of	 contracts,	 including	 the	 totality	 of	 facts	 and	
economic	relations	surrounding	commercial	transactions,	in	order	to	identify	the	
rights	and	obligations	of	the	parties	in	a	business	project.74		
	
While	contract	law	theory	has	challenged	the	artificial	notion	of	contracts	as	
distinct	 instant	 transactions	 and	 has	 highlighted	 the	 need	 for	 informality	 and	
contextualisation,	 arbitration	 law	 has	 remained	 adherent	 to	 neo-classical	
theories	of	contract	law.	These	theories	allow	some	scope	for	reasonable	reliance	
and	promissory	estoppel,	but	they	largely	require	that	consent	be	demonstrated	
with	a	high	degree	of	specificity	at	the	time	the	contract	is	concluded.75	Indeed,	
for	arbitration	 law	on	non-signatories,	 as	 for	neo-classical	 theories	on	contract	
law,	subsequent	informal	or	contextual	communications	are	mostly	irrelevant.76	
	
																																																								
70	See	 for	 example	 in	 the	 US	 the	 influential	 work	 of	 I.R.	 Macneil,	 e.g.	 in	 'The	Many	 Futures	 of	
Contract'	 (1974)	47	 Southern	California	 Law	Review	691,	 and	 ‘Contracts:	Adjustment	 of	 Long-
Term	 Economic	 Relations	 under	 Classical,	 Neoclassical	 and	 Relational	 Contract	 Law’,	 (1977-
1978)	72	Northwestern	University	Law	Review	854	 	 and	more	 recently	 in	 the	UK	 the	work	of	
David	 Campbell,	 e.g.	 in	D.	 Campbell,	 L.	Mulcahy	 and	 Sally	Wheeler	 (eds),	Changing	Concepts	of	
Contract:	Essays	in	Honour	of	Ian	Macneil	(Palgrave	Macmilan	2013).		
71	P.S.	Atiyah,	The	Rise	and	Fall	of	Freedom	of	Contract	(Oxford	University	Press	1985).	
72	See	 Randy	 Barnett,	 ‘The	 Richness	 of	 Contract	 Theory’,	 (1999)	 97	 Mich.	 L.	 Rev.	 1413-1429,	
reviewing	 Robert	 A.	 Hillman,	 The	 Richness	 Of	 Contract	 Law:	 An	 Analysis	 And	 Critique	 Of	
Contemporary	Theories	Of	Contract	Law	 (1997).	 See	 also,	Macneil,	 in	 ‘Contracts:	 Adjustment	 of	
Long-Term	Economic	Relations	under	Classical,	Neoclassical	and	Relational	Contract	Law’,	above	
(note	70),	p.	882-83.	
73	Macneil,	'The	Many	Futures	of	Contract',	above	(note	70).	
74	Jay	Feinman,	‘Relational	Contract	Theory	in	Context’,	(1999-2000)	94	Nw.	U.	L.	Rev.	737.	
75	Luke	 Nottage,	 ‘A	 Weathermap	 for	 International	 Arbitration:	 Mainly	 Sunny,	 Some	 Cloud,	
Possible	Thunderstorms’,	Chapter	5	in	Stavros	Brekoulakis,	Julian	Lew	and	Loukas	Mistelis	(eds),	
The	Evolution	and	Future	of	International	Arbitration	(Kluwer	2016).	
76	This	is	the	case	at	least	in	theory,	because	in	practice	(as	the	previous	section	demonstrated),	
courts	and	tribunals	faced	with	the	complexities	of	commercial	reality,	where	parties	often	fail	to	
consent	 to	 every	 term	 of	 a	 transaction	 including	 an	 arbitration	 clause,	 have	 often	 forcefully	
expanded	the	scope	of	‘consent’	far	beyond	anything	close	to	what	the	parties	ever	had	in	mind.	
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One	 might	 suggest	 that	 arbitration	 law	 should	 develop	 a	 non-signatory	
theory	 based	 on	 informality	 and	 contextualisation.77	However,	 this	 suggestion	
would	be	misplaced.	While	 the	goal	 for	modern	contract	 law	might	be	 to	move	
towards	 more	 relational	 theories	 in	 the	 future,	 the	 goal	 for	 arbitration	 law	
should	 be	 to	 retreat,	 at	 least	 to	 some	 extent,	 from	 contract	 law.	 While	 it	 is	
reasonable	for	contract	law	to	develop	theories	that	will	better	explain	the	way	
that	 complex	 contractual	 relationships	 work	 today,	 it	 is	 not	 reasonable	 for	
arbitration	law	to	continue	to	assume	that	whatever	works	for	contracts,	should	
work	for	arbitration	too.				
	
Indeed,	many	of	 the	 limitations	 of	 the	 existing	non-signatory	 theories	 owe	
much	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 have	 been	 broadly	 borrowed	 from	 contract	 or	
corporate	law,	rather	than	been	organically	developed	for	arbitration.	However,	
arbitration	 law	 is	not	a	 form	of	contract	or	corporate	 law;	 it	 is	an	autonomous	
legal	 field	 with	 a	 distinct	 nature	 and	 purpose.	 While	 the	 main	 question	 for	
corporate	and	contract	 law	 is	whether	a	party	 is	 substantively	 liable,	 the	main	
question	 for	 arbitration	 law	 is	whether	 a	 tribunal	 has	 jurisdiction	 to	 resolve	 a	
certain	dispute.		
	
Legal	 theories	 originally	 developed	 to	 answer	 questions	 of	 liability	 used	
instead	 to	 answer	 questions	 of	 jurisdiction	 may	 provide	 us	 with	 the	 wrong	
answers.	 For	 example,	 the	 doctrine	 of	 lifting	 the	 corporate	 veil	 was	 originally	
developed	 and	 mainly	 used	 to	 determine	 whether	 a	 parent	 company	 or	 an	
individual	can	be	held	liable	for	the	debts	of	a	subsidiary.78	The	theory	was	not	
designed	 to	 determine	 whether	 the	 non-signatory	 parent	 company	 should	 be	
bound	by	an	arbitration	agreement	signed	by	its	subsidiary.	The	former	question	
is	a	matter	of	substance;	the	latter	is	a	matter	of	jurisdiction.	
	
While	 in	 theory	 the	analysis	 for	 jurisdictional	purposes	can	be	 ‘analytically	
and	 practically	 distinct	 from	 the	 merits	 of	 a	 piercing	 action,’79	in	 practice	 the	
decision	 of	 a	 arbitration	 tribunal	 to	 assume	 jurisdiction	 over	 a	 non-signatory	
parent	under	the	doctrine	of	lifting	the	corporate	veil	will	essentially	determine	
the	question	of	 liability	of	the	parent	company	too.	It	cannot	be	right,	however,	
that	a	tribunal	will	assume	jurisdiction	over	a	non-signatory	parent	only	when	it	
is	expected	that	the	parent	will	be	eventually	found	liable	too.	It	is	no	surprising,	
thus,	that	international	tribunals	have	been	extremely	reluctant	to	lift	the	veil	of	
an	arbitration	agreement	and	assume	jurisdiction	over	non-signatories,	lest	their	
decision	on	jurisdiction	is	perceived	as	a	precursor	of	their	decision	on	liability.80	
It	becomes	obvious	thus	that	while	this	theory	makes	good	sense	for	corporate	
law,	its	suitability	for	arbitration	purposes	is	questionable.	
																																																								
77	See	for	example,	Keechang	Kim	and	Jason	Mitchenson,	“Voluntary	Third-	Party	Intervention	in	
International	 Arbitration	 for	 Construction	 Disputes:	 A	 Contextual	 Approach	 to	 Jurisdictional	
Issues”,	Journal	of	International	Arbitration,	30	(2013)		407.	
78	See	P	Blumberg,	K	Strasser,	N	Georgakopoulos,	 and	E	Gouvin,	Blumberg	on	Corporate	Groups	
(Aspen,	2005)	ch	6.	
79	See	 John	 Fellas,	 ‘Comments	 on	 Parties	 in	 International	 Arbitration’,	 Chapter	 11	 in	 Stavros	
Brekoulakis,	 Julian	 Lew	 and	 Loukas	 Mistelis	 (eds),	 The	 Evolution	 and	 Future	 of	 International	
Arbitration	(Kluwer	2016).			
80	A	 rare	 example	 being	 Ad	 hoc	 award	 of	 1991,	 (1992)	 2	 ASA	 Bull	 202	 (discussed	 in	 T	
Zuberbühler,	‘Non-signatories	and	the	Consensus	to	Arbitrate’	(2008)	26(1)	ASA	Bull	30).	
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For	 similar	 reasons,	 contract	 law	 theories,	 such	 as	 consent	 by	 conduct	 or	
even	 more	 modern	 theories	 such	 as	 contract	 by	 reliance	 or	 benefit,	 may	 be	
helpful	 to	 ascertain	 consent	 for	 substantive	 contracts	 but	 not	 necessarily	 for	
arbitration	 agreements.	 Commercial	 parties	 often	 participate	 in	 substantive	
contracts	which	they	have	not	signed,	either	by	negotiating	or	performing	part	of	
such	 contracts.	 In	 those	 circumstances,	 consent	 by	 conduct	 or	 ratification	 is	
conceivable.	 However,	 because	 of	 the	 nature	 and	 purpose	 of	 arbitration	
agreements,	 consent	 for	 arbitration	 by	 conduct	 is	 very	 difficult	 to	 ascertain,	
unless	 for	 example	 a	 signatory	 commences	 arbitration	 proceedings	 against	 a	
non-signatory	 who	 does	 not	 object	 to	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	 tribunal	 and	
therefore	consents,	by	conduct,	to	arbitration.	
	
Arbitration	 doctrine	 has	 largely	 ignored	 these	 fundamental	 differences	
between	 arbitration	 agreements	 and	 arbitration	 law	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	
ordinary	contracts	and	contract	law	on	the	other.	Arbitration	law	thus	needs	to	
develop	 a	 theory	 on	 non-signatories	 which	 is	 international	 and	 reflects	 the	
distinct	 jurisdictional	 nature	 and	 purpose	 of	 arbitration.	 The	 following	 section	
offers	an	alternative	theoretical	approach	to	resolve	these	problems,	relying	on	
the	 concept	 of	 dispute,	 which	 is	 the	 main	 essence	 and	 objective	 of	 any	
adjudicatory	system,	including	international	arbitration.		
	
IV. A	 PROPOSAL	 FOR	 A	 GENERAL	 THEORY	 ON	 NON-SIGNATORIES	 BASED	 ON	
THE	CONCEPT	OF	DISPUTE		
	
From	the	preceding	discussion,	it	becomes	apparent	that	the	existing	arbitration	
law	on	non-signatories	 exhibits	 considerable	deficiencies	 in	 theory	and	 fails	 to	
accommodate	complex	business	transactions	in	practice.		
	
International	 arbitration	 would	 benefit	 from	 a	 more	 coherent,	 more	
inclusive	and	intellectually	more	honest	approach	to	non-signatories	that	would	
reflect	 the	 distinct	 jurisdictional	 nature	 of	 arbitration	 and	 would	 be	 better	
equipped	 to	 facilitate	 contemporary	 commerce.	 A	 general	 theory	 on	 non-
signatories	in	international	arbitration	is	needed.	Such	a	theory	requires	that	the	
focus	of	examination	in	non-signatory	disputes	be	shifted	from	consent-based	to	
dispute-based	analysis.	Under	this	approach,	what	matters	is	not	whether	a	non-
signatory	 has	 presumably	 consented	 to	 arbitration	 but	 whether	 and	 to	 what	
extent	a	non-signatory	is	actually	implicated	in	the	dispute	before	an	arbitration	
tribunal.		
	
While	such	a	general	theory	needs	to	be	further	developed	in	future	works,	
the	 following	 sections	 set	 out	 first,	 the	 test	 for	 arbitration	 tribunals	 to	 assume	
jurisdiction	 over	 non-signatories	 under	 a	 dispute-based	 theory;	 second,	 the	
underpinning	justification	for	the	emerging	theory	and,	third,	the	legal	basis	for	
arbitration	 tribunals	 to	 assume	 jurisdiction	 over	 non-signatories	 under	 a	
dispute-based	 theory.	 Further,	 a	 number	 of	 potential	 objections	 to	 a	 dispute-
based	theory	are	examined	and	some	open	questions	requiring	further	work	are	
identified.	At	the	end,	an	overall	assessment	of	the	theory	is	offered.	
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A. A	 Dispute-based	 Test	 to	 Assume	 Jurisdiction	 over	 Non-Signatory	
Claims		
	
The	 concept	 of	 dispute	 is	 critical	 for	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	 international	
tribunals.	 Unless	 a	 dispute	 arises,	 an	 arbitration	 cannot	 come	 to	 life.	 Crucially,	
the	 scope	 and	 implications	 of	 a	 dispute,	 including	 whether	 it	 implicates	 non-
signatories,	 matter	 for	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	 arbitration	 tribunals.	 As	 experience	
from	 modern	 business	 transactions	 shows,	 non-signatories	 may	 become	
implicated,	 often	 inextricably,	 in	 a	 commercial	 project	 or	 a	 transaction	 in	 a	
number	of	different	ways.	81		
	
Examples	from	real	cases	include	the	case	of	a	non-signatory	that	conspires	
and	colludes	with	a	signatory	 to	 frustrate	 the	rights	and	obligations	of	another	
signatory;82	the	case	of	a	non-signatory	State	or	parent	company	that	interferes	
with	 the	 performance	 of	 a	 contract	 between	 a	 state	 entity	 or	 a	 subsidiary	 and	
another	company;83	the	case	where	the	performance	of	a	non-signatory	under	a	
guarantee	contract	depends	on	the	non-performance	of	the	underlying	contract	
between	 two	signatories;84	the	case	where	a	 signatory	and	a	non-signatory	are	
jointly	liable	vis-à-vis	a	signatory.85	
	
In	 these	 examples,	 it	 is	 very	 likely	 that	 the	 resolution	 of	 the	 dispute	 in	
arbitration	between	the	two	signatories	will	depend	on	the	conduct	of	the	non-
signatory	 and	 will	 entail	 the	 examination	 of	 the	 non-signatory’s	 rights	 and	
duties,	 or	 the	 examination	 of	 another	 contract	 involving	 the	 non-signatory.	 A	
claim	 by	 or	 against	 a	 non-signatory	 in	 these	 circumstances	 is	 thus	 an	 integral	
part	of	the	dispute	between	the	signatories,	and	arbitration	tribunals	should	be	
able	to	look	into	such	claim.	
	
Accordingly,	the	proposed	test	for	tribunals	to	assume	jurisdiction	over	non-
signatories	would	be	whether	a	non-signatory	claim	is	inextricably	implicated	in	a	
dispute	 submitted	 for	arbitration.	 Admittedly,	 the	 inquiry	 as	 to	whether	 a	 non-
signatory	claim	 is	 inextricably	 implicated	 in	a	dispute	 is	 inevitably	 fact-specific	
and	 may	 differ	 with	 the	 circumstances	 of	 each	 case.86	However,	 the	 factual	
nature	of	the	test	does	not	necessarily	render	it	discretionary	or	unpredictable.	
Indeed,	a	review	of	cases	from	different	jurisdictions,	which	have	acknowledged	
																																																								
81	Cf	 section	 1	 English	 Arbitration	 Act	 providing	 ‘the	 object	 of	 arbitration	 is	 to	 obtain	 the	 fair	
resolution	of	disputes’.	
82	See	for	example,	Ross	v	American	Express	Ross	v	American	Express	F	3d	(2d	Cir	2008)	and	PRM	
Energy	 Systems	 Inc.	 v.	 Primenergy,	 592	 F.3d	 830	 (8th	 Cir.	 2010).	 See	 also	 in	 France	 Cour	 de	
Cassation	Cass	1e	civ,	11	June	1991,	Orri	v	Lubrifiants	Elf	Aquitaine	(1992)	Rev	Arb	73,	with	note	
D	Cohen.	
83	See	 for	 example,	Dallah	v	Government	of	Pakistan,	 [2010]	UKSC	46	 and	 Interim	Award	of	 23	
September	1982,	ICC	Case	No.	4131,	Y.C.A.	Vol.	IX	(1984),	131	and	Clunet	1983,	at	899.	
84	See	for	example,	Choctaw	Generation	v	American	Home	Assurance	271	F	3d	403	(2d	Cir	2001)	
and	 the	recent	Stemcor	UK	Ltd	v	Global	Steel	Holdings	Ltd	and	Pramod	Mittal	[2015]	EWHC	363	
(Comm).	
85	See	 the	Ashot	Egiazaryan,	Vitaly	Gogokhiya	 v	OJSC	OEK	Finance,	 The	 City	 of	Moscow,	 [2015]	
EWHC	3532	(Comm).	
86	E.g.	Smith	Enron	w	Generation	v	American	Home	Assurance	271	F	3d	403	(2d	Cir	2001).		
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the	importance	of	the	concept	of	dispute	in	non-signatory	cases,	provides	useful	
guidance	as	to	the	minimum	requirements	of	the	test.		
	
To	 begin	 with,	 an	 important	 indication	 that	 a	 non-signatory	 claim	 is	
inextricably	implicated	in	a	dispute	between	two	signatories	in	arbitration	is	the	
question	of	the	non-signatory’s	liability.	If	liability	of	the	non-signatory	depends	
on	the	liability	of	a	signatory,	the	question	of	liability	for	these	two	parties	may	
in	reality	be	a	single	issue,	which	could	be	addressed	by	a	single	tribunal.		
	
For	example,	 in	the	decision	of	 the	High	Court	of	Singapore	 in	Yee	Hong	Pte	
Ltd	 v	 Tan	 Chye	 Hee	 Andrew	 &	 Ho	 Bee	 Development	 Pte	 Ltd,87	a	 developer	 of	 a	
condominium	project	entered	 into	separate	contracts	with	a	contractor	and	an	
architect.	 In	 the	 course	 of	 the	 construction	 project,	 the	 architect	 certified	 that	
there	was	 considerable	delay	on	 the	part	of	 the	 contractor	and	 that,	 therefore,	
the	contractor	was	liable	to	the	developer	for	liquidated	damages.	The	contractor	
brought	a	lawsuit	in	Singapore	against	the	architect	on	the	basis	that	it	had	failed	
to	 act	 fairly	 and	 impartially	 in	 administering	 the	 contract	 and	 that	 it	 had	
wrongfully	 issued	 a	 delay	 certificate.	 The	 architect	 joined	 the	 developer	 in	 the	
lawsuit	 and,	 relying	 on	 the	 arbitration	 agreement	 in	 the	 contract	 with	 the	
developer,	 requested	 the	 court	 to	 refer	 the	 contractor’s	 claim	 to	 arbitration.	
Noting	 that	 an	 earlier	 action	 of	 the	 contractor	 against	 the	 developer	 for	
extension	 of	 time	 had	 already	 been	 stayed	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 an	 arbitration	
agreement	in	the	construction	contract,	the	High	Court	of	Singapore	held	that	the	
two	actions	of	the	contractor	against	the	architect	and	the	developer	should	be	
decided	in	a	single	tripartite	arbitration	between	the	developer,	the	architect	and	
the	main	contractor.		
	
The	 court	 highlighted	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 liability	 of	 the	 architect	 against	 the	
non-signatory	contractor	depended	on	the	determination	of	the	dispute	between	
the	 contractor	 and	 the	 developer	 about	 whether	 the	 former	 was	 entitled	 in	
extension	of	time.	The	court	noted:	
	
It	 is	highly	unsatisfactory	 for	one	dispute	(between	the	[contractor]	and	
the	 [developer])	 to	 be	 referred	 to	 arbitration	 and	 for	 another	 (between	
the	[contractor]	and	the	[architect])	to	be	litigated	separately,	when	both	
disputes	 arose	 out	 of	 the	 same	project.	Such	a	 state	of	affairs	would	not	
determine	the	whole	dispute	among	all	three	parties.	Who	would	ultimately	
decide	 the	 dispute	 concerning	 extensions	 of	 time	 and	 whether	 the	 delay	
certificate	was	properly	issued?88	(emphasis	added)	
	
Another	 important	 element	 of	 the	 test	 will	 be	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 close	
relationship	 between	 a	 non-signatory	 and	 a	 signatory	 party.	 The	 closer	 the	
contractual	 or	 corporate	 links	 between	 them,	 the	 more	 likely	 will	 be	 for	 an	
arbitration	 tribunal	 to	 assume	 jurisdiction	 over	 the	 non-signatory	 claim.	 For	
example,	 in	 deciding	 whether	 a	 claim	 by	 a	 signatory	 against	 a	 non-signatory	
charterer	 should	 be	 referred	 to	 arbitration	 in	 England,	 the	 Federal	 Court	 of	
																																																								
87	Yee	Hong	Pte	Ltd	v	Tan	Chye	Hee	Andrew	&	Ho	Bee	Development	Pte	Ltd	[2005]	4	SLR	398.	
88	Ibid,	at	20.	Cf	ICC	case	no	9762	of	2001,	ICC	case	no	9762	of	2001,	(2004)	29	YBCA	26.	Cf	also,	
Morrie	Mages	v	Thrifty	Corporation	916	F	2d	402	(7th	Cir	1990).		
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Australia	 in	BHPB	Freight	Pty	Ltd	 v	Cosco	Oceania	Chartering	Pty	Ltd	 held	 that	
one	of	the	conditions	for	a	non-signatory	to	claim	‘through	or	under	a	signatory’	
party89	is	 that	 ‘a	relationship	of	 sufficient	proximity’	 between	 the	 signatory	 and	
the	non-signatory	must	exist.90	Australian	courts	in	other	cases	have	found	that	a	
‘relationship	 of	 sufficient	 proximity’	 existed	 in	 cases	 where	 a	 claim	 has	 been	
brought	 by	 a	 non-signatory	 subsidiary	 and	 a	 signatory	 parent	 company	 (or	
against	a	non-signatory	parent	company	and	a	signatory	subsidiary).91	That	was,	
for	example,	 the	case	 in	Flint	Ink	NZ	Ltd	v	Huhtamaki	Australia	Pty	Ltd,	where	a	
non-signatory	subsidiary	was	held	to	be	bound	by	an	arbitration	agreement	on	
the	 basis	 that	 the	 non-signatory	 was	 claiming	 ‘through	 or	 under’	 a	 company	
within	 the	 same	 corporate	 group	 which	 had	 signed	 a	 contract,	 including	 an	
arbitration	clause,	with	a	seller	for	the	purchase	of	ink.92		
	
The	 inquiry	 of	 Australian	 courts	 about	 	 ‘a	 relationship	 of	 sufficient	
proximity’	between	the	signatory	and	the	non-signatory	party	echoes	the	inquiry	
of	many	arbitration	tribunals	about	‘group	structure’	in	the	context	of	the	‘group	
of	 companies’	 doctrine,	 and	 the	 inquiry	 of	 many	 US	 Courts	 about	 ‘identity	 of	
interests’93	or	 ‘integral	 relationship’94	between	 non-signatory	 parent	 companies	
and	signatory	subsidiaries	under	the	arbitration	estoppel	doctrine.		
	
A	third	element	of	the	proposed	test	will	be	the	existence	of	intertwined	
claims	 and	 contracts	 between	 signatories	 and	 non-signatories.	 Against	 a	
background	of	closely	interrelated	substantive	contracts,	a	number	of	arbitration	
tribunals	and	national	courts	have	found	that	a	signatory	should	be	enjoined	to	
arbitrate	 its	 claim	 against	 a	 non-signatory	 (and	 vice	 versa)	 if	 the	 underlying	
substantive	contracts	and	claims	by	and	against	signatories	and	non-signatories	
are	closely	interrelated.		
	
For	 example,	 in	 the	 ICC	 case	 no	 9762	 of	 2001,95	a	 contractor	 brought	 a	
claim	against,	among	others,	the	Ministry	of	Agriculture	and	Food	of	State	Z	that	
was	a	party	to	the	contract	containing	an	ICC	arbitration	agreement,	and	a	claim	
against	 the	 non-signatory	 State	 Z.	 The	 tribunal	 assumed	 jurisdiction	 over	 both	
the	 claim	 against	 the	 signatory	Ministry	 of	 Agriculture	 and	 Food	 and	 the	 non-
signatory	State	Z,	on	the	basis	that	the	claims	against	the	signagory	and	the	non-
signatory	were	interrelated	as	both	respondents	were	potentially	co-liable	vis-à-
vis	the	claimant.	The	tribunal	noted	that:	‘The	right	of	a	claimant	to	act	against	all	
																																																								
89	As	section	7(4)	of	the	Australian	International	Arbitration	Act	1974	provides.	
90	(2008)	FCR	169	(Federal	Court	of	Australia),	at	para.	15.	See	further	James	Morrison	and	Luke	
Nottage	 Country	 Report	 on	 Australia	 for	 Simon	 Greenberg,	 Christopher	 Kee	 and	 Romesh	
Weeramantry,	 International	 Commercial	 Arbitration:	 An	 Asia-Pacific	 Perspective	 (2nd	 Ed)	 (CUP	
2011)	available	at	http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2514124.	
91	Although	this	factor	alone	may	not	necessarily	suffice,	see	McHutchison	v	Western	Research	and	
Development	Ltd	[2004]	FCA	1234	(Federal	Court	of	Australia).	
92	Flint	Ink	NZ	Ltd	v	Huhtamaki	Australia	Pty	Ltd	[2014]	VSCA	166.	
93	Smith/Enron	Cogeneration	v	Smith	Cogeneration	Int’l	198	F	3d	88	(2d	Cir	1999),	at	98.	
94	Sunkist	Soft	Drinks	v	Sunkist	Growers	 10	 F	 3d	 753	 (11th	 Cir	 1981).	 See	 also	 JJ	Ryan	&	Sons	v	
Rhone	 Poulenc	 Textile	 863	 F	 2d	 315,	 320–1	 (4th	 Cir	 1988)	 and	 Astra	 Oil	 Company	 v.	 Rover	
Navigation,	344	F.3d	276	(2d	Cir.	2003).	
95	ICC	case	no	9762	of	2001,	(2004)	29	YBCA	26.	
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possible	 responsible	 subjects	 cannot	 be	 denied’96	and	 that	 ‘no	 distinction	 can	 be	
made	between	the	liability	of	first	respondent	[the	Ministry]	and	third	respondent	
[State	 Z]	 (if	 any).’97	The	 tribunal	 recognised	 that	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 tribunal’s	
jurisdiction	must	 be	 determined	 in	 light	 of	 the	 substantive	 background	 of	 the	
dispute	 submitted	 to	 arbitration,	 and	 that	 the	 substantive	 commitments	
undertaken	 by	 signatories	 and	 non-signatories	 are	 relevant	 for	 a	 tribunal	 to	
assume	jurisdiction	over	a	non-signatory:	
[.	 .	 .]	 the	 mandatory	 force	 of	 the	 arbitration	 clause	 (or	 arbitration	
agreement)	cannot	be	dissociated	from	that	of	the	substantive	contractual	
commitments.	This	may	be	the	case	of	companies	belonging	to	the	same	
‘group	of	companies’,	whenever	there	is	a	sufficient	evidence	of	the	global	
liability	of	the	‘group’.	This	may	be	the	case	of	an	individual	partner	being	
bound	by	an	arbitration	clause	signed	by	a	general	partnership.	This	may	
also	be	the	case	of	States	when	engaging	 in	 transactions	of	an	economic	
nature	 through	 one	 of	 their	 administrative	 bodies,	 or	 even	 through	 a	
separate	 legal	 entity	 provided,	 in	 this	 last	 case,	 that	 the	 State	 has	 full	
control	over	it	and	is	bound	by	the	acts	of	it.98	
	
Similarly,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 fraud	 claims	 against	 signatories	 and	 non-
signatories	 or	 claims	 for	 unlawful	 interference	 by	 a	 non-signatory	 with	 a	
contract	 between	 two	 signatories,	 the	 US	 courts	 have	 repeatedly	 held	 that	 all	
claims	 by	 and	 against	 signatories	 and	 non-signatories	 should	 be	 heard	 by	 a	
single	arbitration	tribunal	especially	if	the	alleged	collusive	actions	or	claims	for	
interference	 are	 intimately	 founded	 in	 and	 intertwined	 with	 the	 underlying	
contract	obligations	between	the	signatories.99	
	
The	above	should	be	qualified	by	 the	 following	caveat.	 If	 the	signatories	
have	agreed	to	arbitrate	only	very	specific	claims	that	might	arise	between	the	
two	of	them,	it	would	not	be	possible	for	a	tribunal	to	assume	jurisdiction	over	
non-signatory	 claims.	 A	 narrowly	 drafted	 arbitration	 agreement	 will	 provide	
tribunals	 will	 narrow	 scope	 of	 authority	 and	 disputes	 with	 wider	 commercial	
implications,	 including	 on	 non-signatories,	 will	 necessarily	 fall	 outside	 the	
tribunal’s	 jurisdiction.	 However,	 widely	 drafted	 arbitration	 agreements	 may	
cover	 disputes	 that	 arise	 out	 of	 complex	 projects	 implicating	 non-signatory	
claims.		
	
The	 role	 of	 a	 broad	 arbitration	 agreement	 in	 non-signatory	 claims	 has	
been	confirmed	by	several	national	courts.	For	example,	in	JLM	v	Stolt-Nielsen	the	
US	 Second	 Circuit	 focused	 on	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 arbitration	 agreement	 in	 the	
charterparty	to	accept	jurisdiction	over	a	non-signatory,	noting:	
																																																								
96	Ibid,	para	55	of	the	award.	
97	Ibid,	para	58	of	the	award.	
98	Ibid,	at	paras	49–55.	See	similar	decisions	by	national	courts	in.	
99	See	 for	 example	 PRM	 Energy	 Systems	 Inc.	 v.	 Primenergy,	 592	 F.3d	 830	 (8th	 Cir.	 2010)	 and	
earlier	decisions	in	Choctaw	Generation	Ltd.	v.	Am.	Home	Assurance,	271	F.3d	403	(2nd	Cir	2001),	
Grigson	 v.	 Creative	 Artists	 Agency,	 L.L.C.,	210	 F.3d	 524,	 527	 (5th	 Cir	 2000),	 McBro	 Planning	
Development	 v	 Triangle	 Electrical	 Construction	 741	 F	 2d	 342	 (11th	 Cir	 1984),	 and	 Hughes	
Masonry	v	Greater	Clark	County	School	Bldg	659	F	2d	836	(7th	Cir	1981).	
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[R]ecognizing	there	is	some	range	in	the	breadth	of	arbitration	clauses,	a	
court	should	classify	the	particular	clause	as	either	broad	or	narrow.	[.	.	.]	
Where	the	arbitration	clause	is	narrow,	a	collateral	matter	will	generally	
be	ruled	beyond	its	purview.	Where	the	arbitration	clause	is	broad,	there	
arises	a	presumption	of	 arbitrability	and	arbitration	of	 even	a	 collateral	
matter	will	 be	 ordered	 if	 the	 claim	 alleged	 implicates	 issues	 of	 contract	
construction	or	the	parties’	rights	and	obligations	under	it.100	
	
Accordingly,	 the	 court	 concluded:	 ‘Because	 the	 [present]	 arbitration	 clause	 is	
broad,	 its	 coverage	 extends	 to	 “collateral	matters”’101	(i.e.	 the	 claim	 of	 the	 non-
signatory	against	the	signatory).102	
	
The	 above	 are	 some	 factors	 that	 can	 be	 taken	 into	 account	 by	 international	
tribunals	 to	determine	 the	extent	 to	which	a	non-signatory	 is	 implicated	 in	 the	
dispute	 between	 two	 signatories,	 and	 therefore	 the	 propriety	 of	 assuming	
jurisdiction	 over	 non-signatories.	 In	 all	 cases,	 the	 inquiry	 should	 focus	 on	 the	
scope	 of	 the	 dispute	 before	 them	 and	 its	 commercial	 implications	 on	 both	
signatories	and	non-signatories.		
	
B. The	Underpinning	Justification	for	the	Emerging	Theory		
	
Depending	 on	 the	 factual	 circumstances,	 the	 underpinning	 justification	 for	
the	emerging	theory	lies	with	considerations	of	equity,	access	to	justice	and	due	
process.	 Equity	 considerations,	 for	 example,	will	 support	 the	 joinder	 of	 a	 non-
signatory	 in	 arbitration	 in	 circumstances	 similar	 to	 the	Dallah	 scenario.	While	
contract-based	 analysis	 by	 the	Dallah	 tribunal	 as	 well	 as	 the	 French	 Court	 of	
Appeal	and	the	UK	Supreme	Court	wrongly	focused	on	whether	the	Government	
of	Pakistan	consented	by	conduct	to	arbitration,	the	factual	circumstances	of	the	
dispute	give	rise	to	obvious	considerations	of	equity.	It	is	clearly	troubling	when	
a	 State	 establishes	 a	 state-entity	 to	 sign	 a	 contract,	 including	 an	 arbitration	
clause,	which	 the	State	negotiates,	only	 for	 the	 state-entity	 to	 cease	 to	exist	by	
the	 time	 a	 dispute	 arises.	With	 the	 state-entity	 defunct,	 whether	 the	 claimant	
should	be	able	 to	bring	a	claim	against	 the	State	 in	arbitration,	 rather	 than	 the	
State’s	own	courts,	is	not	a	matter	of	consent;	it	is	a	matter	of	equity,	especially	
when	the	State	is	strongly	implicated	in	the	underlying	contract	and	the	ensuing	
dispute.		
	
Similar	 considerations	 will	 underpin	 circumstances	 where	 a	 parent	 non-
signatory	company	seeks	to	avoid	arbitration	when	the	signatory	subsidiary	has	
become	 insolvent	at	 the	 time	the	dispute	arises	or	has	been	 left	with	no	assets	
for	the	claimant	to	recover	damages	in	arbitration.103		
																																																								
100	JLM	Industries	v	Stolt-Nielsen,	 387	F	3d	163,	2004	 (2d	Cir	2004)	at	172,	 citing	Louis	Dreyfus	
Negoce	SA	v	Blystad	Shipping	&	Trading	Inc	252	F	3d	218,	224	(2d	Cir	2001).	
101	Ibid.	
102	See	 also	MS	 Dealer	 Serv	 Corp	 v	 Franklin	 177	 F	 3d	 942,	 947	 (11th	 Cir	 1999)	 and	Meyer	 v.	
WMCO-GP,	211	SW3d	302,	305	(Tex.	2006).	
103	Cf	 also	 Aubrey	 Thomas,	 “Non-Signatories	 in	 Arbitration:	 a	 Good	 Faith	 Analysis”	 14	Lewis	&	
Clark	 L.	 Rev.	 2010,	 953,	 who	 proposes	 that	 national	 courts	 should	 adopt	 equitable	 principles,	
such	 as	 the	 principle	 of	 good	 faith,	 to	 determine	 whether	 a	 non-signatory	 should	 arbitrate	 a	
dispute.		
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There	 are	other	 circumstances	where	 a	non-signatory	will	 have	 an	 interest	
relating	to	the	property	or	transaction	that	is	the	subject	of	the	arbitration	and	it	
is	 so	 situated	 that	 the	disposition	of	 the	arbitration	may,	 as	 a	practical	matter,	
impair	 or	 impede	 the	 non-signatory’s	 ability	 to	 protect	 that	 interest,	 not	 least	
because	the	non-signatory	is	not	adequately	represented	by	any	of	the	signatory	
parties	to	the	arbitration.104	In	these	circumstances,	allowing	a	non-signatory	to	
participate	in	an	arbitration	between	two	signatories	is	the	only	way	for	the	non-
signatory	to	protect	its	right	to	access	to	justice,	105	especially	as	non-signatories	
are	 often	 unable	 to	 commence	 court	 proceedings	 to	 protect	 their	 interests	
against	 signatories.	 Indeed,	 on	 several	 occasions,	 national	 courts	 have	 stayed	
proceedings	or	declined	jurisdiction	over	a	claim	by	a	non-signatory	on	the	basis	
that	 a	 closely	 related	 claim	 is	 already	 pending	 in	 arbitration	 between	 the	
signatories.	106	Requiring	 a	 non-signatory	 party	 to	 wait	 until	 the	 arbitration	
between	the	signatories	is	concluded	and,	at	the	same	time,	prohibiting	the	non-
signatory	from	participating	in	the	arbitration	that	is	likely	to	affect	its	legal	and	
commercial	interests,	undermines	its	right	to	access	to	justice	and	its	right	to	be	
heard.107	Even	 if	 the	non-signatory	 is	 able	 to	proceed	with	 its	 court	 claim	after	
the	conclusion	of	the	arbitration	between	the	signatories,	it	is	likely	that	the	non-
signatory’s	 interests	would	have	already	been	affected,	potentially	 irreversibly,	
by	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	 arbitration	 which	 the	 non-signatory	 was	 unable	 to	
participate.	
	
Assume,	 for	 example,	 the	 case	 where	 a	 litigation	 between	 a	 subcontractor	
and	 a	 main	 contractor	 is	 stayed	 until	 the	 arbitration	 between	 the	 main	
contractor	and	the	employer	is	concluded.	If	the	arbitrators	decide	that	the	main	
contractor	is	liable	to	the	employer	for	delays	in	delivery	of	the	works,	actually	
performed	 by	 the	 subcontractor,	 the	 subsequent	 litigation	 between	 the	 main	
contractor	 and	 the	 subcontractor	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 moot.	 The	 ability	 of	 the	
subcontractor	to	set	out	its	case	in	full	will	be	considerably	curtailed	as	a	result	
of	the	outcome	of	the	arbitration,	which	the	subcontractor	had	no	opportunity	to	
influence.108		
	
In	this	respect,	 in	a	number	of	 jurisdictions,	an	arbitral	award	between	two	
signatories	 may	 produce	 preclusive	 effects	 that	 apply	 to	 issues	 of	 fact	 or	 law	
(‘issue	 preclusion’	 in	 the	 US	 or	 ‘collateral	 estoppel’	 in	 England”).109	Courts	 in	
different	 jurisdictions	 have	 held	 that,	 under	 certain	 circumstances,	 a	 signatory	
																																																								
104	Strong	above	(note	8).	
105	See	Strong	above	(note	8)	979	who	argues	for	the	right	of	the	non-signatory	to	intervene	on	
the	basis	of	a	broader	construction	of	the	principle	of	equality	of	the	parties,	a	term	who,	as	she	
convincingly	argues,	may	include	the	non-signatory.	
106	See	for	example,	Morrie	Mages	v	Thrifty	Corporation	916	F	2d	402	(7th	Cir	1990).	
107 	See	 Matti	 S.	 Kurkela	 and	 Santu	 Turunen,	 “Due	 Process	 in	 International	 Commercial	
Arbitration”,	(Second	Edition),	(Oxford	University	Press	2010),	at	186.	
108	Strong	above	(note	8)	983.	
109	See	more	generally,	 Stavros	Brekoulakis,	 “The	Effect	of	an	 International	Arbitral	Award	and	
Third	Parties”,	American		
28	
	
can	 rely	 on	 the	 issue	 preclusion	 effect	 of	 an	 arbitration	 award	 against	 a	 non-
signatory	in	subsequent	arbitration	or	litigation.	110			
	
It	 is	difficult	 to	 justify,	 in	 terms	of	 justice	 to	access	and	due	process,	how	a	
non-signatory	can	be	the	subject	of	preclusive	effect	from	an	arbitration	between	
two	 signatories	 in	 which	 the	 non-signatory	 is	 denied	 access	 as	 a	 matter	 of	
principle.	Under	French	law,	a	non-signatory	can	challenge	any	adverse	effect	of	
an	award	in	domestic	arbitration	under	the	legal	construct	of	tierce	opposition.111	
Notably,	 the	 French	 Tribunal	 de	 Grande	 Instance	 de	 Paris,	 very	 recently,	
extended	 the	 tierce	 opposition	 recourse	 against	 international	 awards,	 rightly	
noting	that	considerations	of	access	to	justice	and	fundamental	principles	of	due	
process	 require	 that	 an	 affected	 non-signatory	 party	 can,	 albeit	 exceptionally,	
oppose	 the	 enforcement	of	 an	 international	 award	between	 two	 signatories.112	
However,	 the	 recourse	 of	 tierce	 opposition	 or	 a	 similar	 legal	 construct	 hardly	
exist	outside	France,	 leaving	non-signatories	generally	unable	to	have	access	to	
an	arbitration	which	may	affect	their	interests	in	the	first	place	or	challenge	the	
ensuing	arbitration	award	at	the	end.	
		
In	 other	 cases,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 the	 non-signatory,	 it	may	 be	 unlikely	 that	
complete	relief	 is	accorded	among	the	signatories	in	arbitration.	In	these	cases,	
unless	the	non-signatory	is	joined	in	the	arbitration,	the	right	to	access	to	justice	
for	one	of	the	signatories	may	be	impaired.113		
	
National	litigation	laws	are	well	familiar	with	these	cases	and	the	underlying	
considerations	 relating	 to	 access	 to	 justice	 and	due	process.	 Indeed,	 almost	 all	
national	 litigation	 systems	 set	 out	 effective	 procedural	 mechanisms,	 often	 of	
mandatory	nature,	to	allow	a	third	party	or	one	of	the	original	parties	to	protect	
their	 rights	 in	 a	 court.	 For	 example,	 the	 US	 Federal	 Rules	 of	 Civil	 Proceedings	
provide	for	intervention	as	a	matter	of	right,114	as	well	as	for	mandatory	joinder	
of	a	third	party	who	is	so	closely	interrelated	in	the	dispute	between	the	original	
																																																								
110	In	 the	 US	 for	 example,	 preclusive	 effect	 can	 be	 produced	 if	 the:	 “Issue	 Preclusion]	 is	
permissible	as	to	a	given	issue	if	[:]	(1)	the	identical	 issue	was	raised	in	a	previous	proceeding;	
(2)	the	 issue	was	actually	 litigated	and	decided	in	the	previous	proceeding;	(3)	the	party	had	a	
full	and	fair	opportunity	to	 litigate	the	issue;	[]	(4)	the	resolution	of	the	issue	was	necessary	to	
support	 a	 valid	 and	 final	 judgment	 on	 the	merits[;]	 .	 .	 .	 [and	 (5)]	 application	of	 the	doctrine	 is	
fair.”	Bear,	Stearns	&	Co.,	Inc.	v.	1109580	Ontario,	Inc.,	409	F.3d	87,	91	(2d	Cir.	2005]	[check].	See	
also	Executive	Risk	Indem,	Inc	v	Jones	89	Cal	Rptr	3d	747	(Cal	Ct	App	2009)	where	the	California	
Court	 of	 Appeal	 found	 that	 an	 arbitration	 award	 between	 an	 insured	 and	 a	 financial	 firm	
produced	 issue	preclusion	 against	 the	non-signatory	 insurance	 company	 in	 relation	 to	 liability	
and	the	amount	of	damages	the	insured	has	suffered.	See	also	in	France	the	Cour	de	Cassation,	23	
January	2007,	Prodim	v	Distribution	Casino	France	(2007)	Rev	Arb	135	which	also	found	that	an	
arbitral	 award	 can	 produce	 preclusive	 effects	 against	 non-signatories.	 	 The	 same	was	 held	 by	
English	courts	in	Stargas	SpA	v	Petredec	Ltd	(The	Sargasso)	[1994]	1	Lloyd’s	Rep	412.	
111	See	the	French	Code	de	Civil	Procedure	Art.	583-585.	
112	See	decision	of	25	April	2017,	5ème	chambre	1ère	section	N°	RG:	15/17869.	“Le	droit	effectif	
au	 juge	et	 l’exigence	d’un	procès	équitable	 ,	méconnus	par	 l’	 impossibilité	pour	 le	 tiers	 lésé	de	
faire	tierce	opposition	à	une	sentence	arbitrale	internationale,	ne	peut	être	assuré	que	par	cette	
voie	de	recours	exceptionnelle.”		
113	Ibid	 at	 982,	 where	 she	 conceptualises	 the	 right	 of	 the	 signatory	 to	 join	 a	 non-signatory	 in	
terms	of	its	right	to	have	a	full	opportunity	to	be	heard	982.	
114	US	Fed.R.C.P.	r.24(a);		
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parties	that	its	presence	in	the	litigation	is	considered	necessary.115	The	English	
Civil	 Procedure	 Rules	 require	 that	 where	 a	 third	 party	 is	 jointly	 entitled	 to	 a	
remedy	with	 one	 of	 the	 original	 parties,	 the	 third	 party	must	 be	 joined	 in	 the	
litigation	as	a	matter	of	necessity.116	The	French	Code	of	Civil	Procedure	provides	
that	 a	 third	 party	 will	 be	 forced	 to	 join	 the	 court	 proceedings	 when	 the	 final	
judgment	will	bind	not	only	the	original	parties	but	the	third	party	too.117		
	
While	 some	 of	 the	 underpinning	 considerations	 of	 third-party	 litigation	
mechanisms	relate	to	procedural	efficiency	and	may	not	be	readily	applicable	in	
arbitration,	other	considerations	relate	 to	 the	protection	of	 legitimate	 interests	
of	the	original	parties	and	third	parties,	as	well	as	the	protection	of	their	right	to	
access	to	justice	and	due	process.118		
	
This	kind	of	considerations	is	equally	important	for	litigation	and	arbitration.	
In	fact,	 in	some	cases,	considerations	favouring	participation	of	non-signatories	
may	 be	 stronger	 in	 arbitration	 than	 in	 litigation.	 For	 example,	 under	 certain	
circumstances,	national	 litigation	laws	provide	that	unless	a	third	party,	who	is	
classified	 as	 indispensable,	 is	 joined	 in	 litigation,	 litigation	 cannot	 proceed.119	
While	in	litigation,	national	courts	have	the	statutory	power	to	dismiss	a	claim	in	
the	 absence	 of	 the	 indispensable	 third	party,	 arbitration	 tribunals	 do	not	 have	
similar	powers.	The	contractual	and	statutory	duty	of	arbitrators	 is	 to	exercise	
their	mandate	and	decide	the	dispute.120	In	such	circumstances,	joining	the	non-
signatory	 indispensable	 party	 in	 arbitration	 would	 be	 the	 only	 option	 for	 the	
signatories’	right	to	obtain	relief	in	arbitration	and	exercise	their	right	to	access	
to	justice.		
	
In	 sum,	 there	 are	 a	 number	 of	 important	 considerations	 favouring	 a	 broad	
mechanism	 for	 participation	 of	 non-signatories	 in	 arbitration.	 The	 fact	 that	 in	
arbitration	party	 autonomy	 is	 the	 overriding	 consideration	 should	not	 of	 itself	
prevent	us,	as	a	matter	of	principle,	from	accounting	for	these	considerations	in	
arbitration	 doctrine,	 and	 from	 seeking	 ways	 to	 include	 non-signatories	 in	 the	
																																																								
115	US	Fed.R.C.P.	r.19.		
116	English	 Civil	 Procedural	 Rules	 19.3(1):	 “where	 a	 claimant	 claims	 a	 remedy	 to	 which	 some	
other	 person	 is	 jointly	 entitled	 with	 him,	 all	 persons	 jointly	 entitled	 to	 the	 remedy	must	 be	
parties	unless	the	court	orders	otherwise”.		
117	Art	 331(2).	 See	 also	Art	 332(1):	 “le	 juge	 peut	 inviter	 les	 parties	 a	mettre	 en	 cause	 tous	 les	
intéresses	dont	la	présence	luit	paraît	nécessaire	a	la	solution	du	litige”.		
118	US	Fed.R.C.P	r.19.		
119	US	Fed.R.C.P.	 r.19.	Under	rule	concerning	 joinder,	party	shall	be	 joined	as	necessary	party	 if	
(1)	 in	person's	absence	complete	relief	cannot	be	accorded	among	those	already	parties,	or	(2)	
person	claims	interest	in	subject	of	action	and	is	so	situated	that	disposition	of	action	in	person's	
absence	may,	as	practical	matter,	 impair	person's	ability	to	protect	that	interest	or	leave	any	of	
the	persons	already	parties	subject	to	substantial	risk	of	incurring	double,	multiple,	or	otherwise	
inconsistent	 obligations	 by	 reason	 of	 claimed	 interest.	 For	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 historical	
underpinnings	through	the	modern	application	of	the	US	Fed.R.C.P.	r.19	see	Brandon	Coyle,	“The	
Proper	 Standard	 of	 Review	 for	 Required	 Party	 Determinations	 Under	 Federal	 Rule	 of	 Civil	
Procedure	19”	84	Fordham	L.	Rev.	1117	2015-2016.		
120	Cf	 for	example,	Article	42	of	 the	 ICC	Arbitration	Rules	providing	 that	 the	arbitrators	have	a	
duty	to	render	an	enforceable	award,	and	s.24(1)	of	the	English	Arbitration	Act	providing	that	an	
arbitrator	who	fails	to	conduct	the	arbitration	can	be	removed	by	the	English	courts.		
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arbitration	process	 in	 appropriate	 circumstances.	 	 As	 in	 other	 legal	 fields,	 it	 is	
appropriate	to	be	able	to	balance	the	parties’	will	against	fundamental	principles	
of	access	to	justice,	equity	and	due	process.121	
	
C. Legal	basis	for	the	implementation	of	the	emerging	theory	
	
The	 implementation	 of	 the	 proposed	 theory	 on	 non-signatories	 will	
require	a	reform	of	the	current	arbitration	law.	The	safest	way	to	effect	a	reform	
on	 this	matter	would	be	 through	 legislation	or	national	 courts.	 If	 legislators	or	
national	 courts,	 for	 the	 reasons	explained	 in	 the	preceding	 section,	decide	 that	
non-signatories	should	be	granted	some	ability	 to	participate	 in	 the	arbitration	
proceedings,	 they	 can	 develop	 a	 legal	 rule	 whereby	 arbitration	 tribunals	 will	
have	 jurisdiction	 to	 hear	 non-signatory	 claims	 which	 are	 “inextricably	 linked”	
with	the	dispute	between	two	signatories,	or	on	the	basis	of	another	test	to	that	
effect.		
	
As	 already	 mentioned,	 there	 is	 currently	 a	 confirmed	 policy	 favouring	
arbitration	 as	 the	 preferred	 method	 for	 resolving	 disputes	 arising	 out	 of	
international	commercial	transactions.	For	legislators	and	national	courts	to	take	
a	step	 further	and	establish	 international	commercial	arbitration	as	 the	default	
method	 for	disputes	arising	out	of	complex	multiparty	 transactions	would	be	a	
perfectly	justifiable	policy	decision.		
	
Admittedly,	expanding	 the	pro-arbitration	policy	 to	non-signatories	may	
appear	to	be	in	tension	with	the	right	to	court	trial,	which	in	some	jurisdictions	is	
constitutionally	 protected.122	For	 that	 reason,	 the	 suggested	 reform	 should	 be	
reserved	for	entirely	commercial	disputes,	and	exclude	consumers,	employees	or	
any	 category	 of	 non-commercial	 disputes	 involving	 groups	 of	 litigants	 who	
require	legislative	or	constitutional	protection.	In	any	case,	with	the	remarkable	
growth	of	international	arbitration	in	the	last	thirty	years,	the	idea	that	national	
courts	 are	 the	 natural	 adjudicatory	 forum	 is	 becoming	 increasingly	 difficult	 to	
defend,	 especially	 for	 commercial	 disputes. 123 	International	 arbitration	 can	
provide	commercial	parties	with	an	alternative	route	to	justice	which	should	not	
be	constitutionally	problematic.					
	
Relatedly,	there	have	recently	been	suggestions	by	prominent	arbitration	
practitioners	and	scholars	that	States	should	take	steps	to	reset	the	default	of	all	
international	 commercial	 disputes	 from	 national	 litigation	 to	 international	
arbitration. 124 	Most	 notably,	 Gary	 Born	 has	 convincingly	 argued	 for	 the	
																																																								
121	Strong	above	(note	8)	995.	
122	In	the	US	for	example	there	is	a	right	to	jury	trial	[find	citation	to	support	that]	[cite	also	the	
article	for	access	to	justice],	although	see	the	recent	decision	in	Kindred	Nursing	Centers	Limited	
v.	Clark	(No.	16-32,	May	15,	2017),	where	the	US	Supreme	Court	held	(with	a	wide	majority	of	7-
1)	that	state	rules	requiring	a	“clear	statement”	in	a	agency	agreement	waiving	the	right	to	a	jury	
trial	in	court	were	violating	the	US	Federal	Arbitration	Act,	and	were	therefore	unenforceable.		
123	See	Pinsolle	above	(note	124).	
124 	Gary	 Born,	 (‘BIT’s	 BAT’s	 and	 Buts’	 (available	 at:	
https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Editorial/News/Documents/BITs
-BATs-and-Buts.pdf).	See	also	Giles	Cuniberti,	‘Beyond	Contract:	The	Case	for	Default	Arbitration	
in	 International	 Commercial	Disputes’,	 (2009)	32	Fordham	 Int’l	 L.J.	 417,	 472	 and	 see	Philippe,	
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development	 of	 international	 arbitration	 treaties,	 bilateral	 or	 multilateral,	
providing	 that	 certain	 categories	 of	 commercial	 disputes	 between	 nationals,	
including	governmental	agencies,	of	 the	signatory	States	shall	be	resolved,	as	a	
default	mechanism,	by	international	commercial	arbitration.	125	
	
A	bilateral	arbitration	treaty	resetting	the	default	from	national	litigation	
to	 international	 commercial	 arbitration	 would	 provide	 the	 power	 to	
international	commercial	 tribunals	 to	entertain	non-signatory	claims	under	 the	
proposed	 unifying	 theory	 on	 non-signatories,	 as	 explicit	 party	 consent	 to	
arbitrate	would	not	be	required.	
	
If	the	suggested	reform	is	not	effected	by	national	courts	or	legislation	at	
national	 or	 international	 level,	 it	 can,	 arguably,	 be	 effected	 by	 international	
commercial	 tribunals.	 This	would	 require	 arbitration	 tribunals	 to	 take	 a	broad	
approach	 to	 their	 own	 jurisdiction.	 This	 approach	will	 involve	 examination	 of	
two	 questions:	 first,	 whether	 the	 tribunal	 has	 jurisdiction	 over	 the	 dispute	
between	two	signatories.	This	is	a	threshold	jurisdictional	question	that	involves	
examination	 of	 whether	 a	 valid	 arbitration	 agreement	 exists	 between	 the	 two	
signatories.	 To	 answer	 this	 question,	 the	 arbitration	 tribunal	 will	 have	 to	
examine	 the	 formal	 and	 substantive	 requirements	 of	 validity	 which	 apply	 to	
every	arbitration	agreement.	
	
If	the	tribunal	finds	that	a	valid	arbitration	agreement	exists	between	two	
signatories,	 the	 tribunal	 will	 subsequently	 have	 to	 examine	 whether	 it	 has	
jurisdiction	over	a	non-signatory	claim.	To	answer	this	question,	the	arbitration	
tribunal	will	have	to	examine	whether	a	non-signatory	claim	is	part	of	the	main	
dispute	for	which	the	tribunal	already	has	jurisdiction.		
	
If	the	tribunal	finds	that	the	non-signatory	claim	is	inextricably	implicated	
in	 the	 dispute	 before	 it,	 it	 may	 decide	 to	 assume	 jurisdiction	 over	 the	 non-
signatory	 claim	 as	 part	 of	 its	 jurisdiction	 over	 the	 dispute	 between	 the	 two	
signatories.	
	
Such	a	broad	approach	to	arbitration	tribunals’	jurisdiction	is	not	novel.	It	
is	supported	by	 theories	emphasising	 the	adjudicatory	character	of	arbitration.	
According	 to	 these	 theories,	 arbitration	 is	 not	 a	 form	 of	 contract	 law;	 it	 is	 a	
decision	making	process	 that	bears	characteristics	of	adjudication.126	From	this	
viewpoint,	arbitrators	perform	an	adjudicative	function	that	can	justify	a	broad	
approach	to	their	own	jurisdiction,	which	would	allow	them	to	dispose	of	every	
claim	 that	 is	an	 integral	part	of	 the	dispute	 in	arbitration,	 including	some	non-
signatory	claims.		
	
D. Potential	objections	to	the	emerging	theory	
	
																																																																																																																																																														
Pinsolle,	 ‘A	 French	 View	 on	 the	 Application	 of	 the	 Arbitration	 Agreement	 to	 Non-Signatories’,	
Chapter	 12	 in	 Stavros	 Brekoulakis	 et	 al.	 (eds),	 The	 Evolution	 and	 Future	 of	 International	
Arbitration	(Kluwer	2016).	
125	Born,	Ibid.	
126	Born	above	(37)	284.	
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Admittedly	 there	 are	 a	 number	 of	 reasons	 that	 might	 give	 us	 pause	 in	
reflecting	upon	the	proposed	theory.	 	Three	are	the	most	important	ones.	First,	
certain	commentators	suggest	that	the	most	appropriate	way	to	deal	with	non-
signatories	 is	 to	 leave	 the	matter	 to	 the	parties	 to	decide	at	 the	drafting	 stage.	
However,	 this	 suggestion	 is	 predicated	 upon	 an	 ideal	 scenario	 of	 two	
experienced	 commercial	 parties	 entering	 into	 long	 and	 careful	 negotiations	
through	specialised	law	firms.	Commercial	reality	can	be	very	different	and	often	
entails	 very	 short	 timeframes	 and	 informal	 circumstances	 of	 negotiations	with	
parties	entering	 into	standard	 forms	of	contract,	where	an	arbitration	clause	 is	
only	one	of	 several	 terms.127	In	other	circumstances,	 the	 involvement	of	a	non-
signatory	in	the	underlying	transaction	and	the	ensuing	dispute	is	not	obvious	or	
cannot	be	anticipated	at	the	time	the	transaction	in	completed,	especially	in	long-
term	relational	contracts.128		
	
Importantly,	 the	 suggestion	 that	 non-signatories	 should	 be	 dealt	 with	 by	
parties	 at	 the	 drafting	 stage	 simply	 begs	 the	 question.	 The	 reality	 is	 that	 in	
practice,	as	the	large	number	of	non-signatory	cases	demonstrate,	parties	fail	to	
deal	with	non-signatories	at	the	time	they	enter	into	a	contract.	However,	this	is	
not	a	valid	reason	 to	prevent	us	 from	seeking	 to	address	 important	 theoretical	
and	practical	problems	arising	out	of	the	failure	of	the	parties	to	provide	for	non-
signatories	at	the	drafting	stage.		
	
Second,	and	relatedly,	there	is	the	suggestion	that	the	emerging	theory	might	
be	inconsistent	with	party	consent	and	party	autonomy,	which	have	traditionally	
been	the	fundamental	basis	for	international	commercial	arbitration.	However,	a	
unifying	 theory	 based	 on	 the	 concept	 of	 dispute	 does	 not	 suggest	 a	 radical	
departure	from	consent,	at	least	in	the	manner	consent	is	currently	conceived	by	
the	existing	non-signatory	theories.	
	
As	already	demonstrated,	arbitration	tribunals	and	national	courts	routinely	
rely	 on	 a	 broad	 concept	 of	 constructive	 consent	 for	 arbitration	 in	 disputes	
involving	 non-signatories.	 However,	 as	 explained	 above,	 the	 proposition	 that	
consent	 for	 the	 underlying	 contract	 necessarily	 entails	 consent	 for	 arbitration	
too	is	problematic	and	difficult	to	reconcile	with	the	very	idea	of	consent.	
	
Understandably,	 the	 existing	 non-signatory	 theories	 have	 relied	 on	
constructive	consent	in	order	to	extend	arbitration	agreements	to	commercially	
relevant	non-signatories.	At	the	same	time,	however,	the	‘sacrosanct’	principle	of	
consent	 for	 arbitration	 is	 already	 compromised	 under	 these	 theories.	 The	
proposed	theory	on	non-signatories	has	the	same	objective	as	the	existing	non-
signatory	 theories,	 namely	 to	 involve	 commercially	 relevant	non-signatories	 in	
arbitration.	 However,	 the	 suggested	 theory	 is	 intellectually	 more	 honest	 in	
recognising	 from	 the	outset	 that	 traditional	 concepts	of	 consent	 cannot	always	
work	 satisfactorily	 for	 disputes	 involving	 non-signatories.	 It	 thus	 suggests	
shifting	the	focus	of	analysis	from	the	concept	of	‘consent’	to	that	of	‘dispute’.		
	
																																																								
127	This	is	typically	the	case,	for	example,	in	maritime,	insurance	and	sale	of	goods	transactions.	
128	Strong	above	(note	8)	995.	
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Relatedly,	if	we	turn	our	focus	on	the	concept	of	‘dispute’,	we	will	realise	that	
non-signatories	are	not	usually	strangers	to	the	dispute	between	two	signatories.	
They	are	often	at	 the	heart	of	both	 the	underlying	commercial	 transaction	and	
the	 ensuing	 dispute	 between	 the	 signatories.	 As	 discussed	 in	 detail	 above,	 the	
typical	 cases	 of	 non-signatories	 include	 the	 non-signatory	 State	 or	 parent	
company	 which	 are	 involved	 in	 a	 project	 through	 a	 signatory	 governmental	
agency	 or	 subsidiary.	 Such	 non-signatories	 are	 usually	 heavily	 engaged	 in	
various	stages	of	the	commercial	transaction	and	often	have	good	knowledge	of	
its	 terms,	 including	 an	 arbitration	 agreement.	 While	 their	 involvement	 in	 the	
commercial	 transaction	 and	 knowledge	 of	 the	 existence	 of	 an	 arbitration	
agreement	are	not	 sufficient	 factors	 to	ascertain	 consent	 for	arbitration,	 as	 the	
existing	non-signatory	theories	wrongly	suggest,	these	factors	provide	important	
justification	 for	 the	 participation	 of	 non-signatories	 in	 arbitration	 through	 non	
consent-based	analysis.		
	
The	 third	 important	 objection	 involves	 the	 question	 of	 enforceability	 of	 an	
award	 that	has	decided	on	a	non-signatory	 claim	on	 the	basis	 of	 the	proposed	
theory.	 The	 issue	 of	 enforceability	 relates	 back	 to	 the	 discussion	 on	 the	 legal	
basis	 for	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 proposed	 theory.	 If	 legislation	 or	 national	
courts	 at	 the	 seat	 of	 arbitration	 have	 adopted	 a	 legal	 rule	 giving	 tribunals	 the	
power	 to	 decide	 non-signatory	 claims	 that	 are	 “inextricably	 implicated”	 in	 the	
dispute	 between	 two	 signatories,	 the	 award	 should	 clearly	 be	 enforceable.	
Unless	 the	courts	of	 the	place	of	enforcement	classify	 the	objection	against	 the	
award	 as	 a	 matter	 of	 public	 policy,	 which	 pursuant	 to	 Article	 V(2)(b)	 of	 the	
United	 Nations	 Convention	 for	 the	 Recognition	 and	 Enforcement	 of	 Foreign	
Arbitral	Awards	(the	“New	York	Convention”)129	will	be	determined	by	the	 law	
of	 the	place	of	enforcement,	any	other	objection	under	Article	V(1)	of	 the	New	
York	 Convention	will	 be	 decided	mainly	 by	 reference	 to	 the	 law	of	 the	 seat	 of	
arbitration.130	
	
If	a	tribunal	decides	to	hear	a	non-signatory	claim	without	the	existence	of	a	
legal	rule	expressively	providing	tribunals	with	such	power,	the	outcome	of	the	
enforceability	 decision	 will	 admittedly	 depend	 on	 the	 approach	 of	 the	
enforcement	 courts.	 If	 the	 enforcement	 courts	 remain	 adherent	 to	 a	 consent-
based	analysis,	 reviewing	 the	award	on	 the	basis	of	whether	 the	non-signatory	
consented	to	arbitration	(under	Article	V(1)(a)	of	the	New	York	Convention),	the	
award	will	most	likely	be	refused	enforcement.		
	
																																																								
129	Article	 V2(b)	 of	 the	New	York	 Convention	 provides:	 “2.	 Recognition	 and	 enforcement	 of	 an	
arbitral	award	may	also	be	refused	if	the	competent	authority	in	the	country	where	recognition	
and	enforcement	is	sought	finds	that:	[….]	
(b)	The	recognition	or	enforcement	of	the	award	would	be	contrary	to	the	public	policy	of	that	
country.”	
130	See	 for	 example,	 Article	 V1(a)	 of	 the	 New	 York	 Convention	 provides:	 “Recognition	 and	
enforcement	of	the	award	may	be	refused,	at	the	request	of	the	party	against	whom	it	is	invoked,	
only	if	that	party	furnishes	to	the	competent	authority	where	the	recognition	and	enforcement	is	
sought,	proof	that:	(a)	The	parties	to	the	agreement	referred	to	in	article	II	were,	under	the	law	
applicable	 to	 them,	under	some	 incapacity,	or	 the	said	agreement	 is	not	valid	under	 the	 law	to	
which	 the	 parties	 have	 subjected	 it	 or,	 failing	 any	 indication	 thereon,	 under	 the	 law	 of	 the	
country	where	the	award	was	made”.	
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However,	if	the	enforcement	courts	decide	to	take	a	dispute-based	approach,	
as	 proposed	 here,	 they	 could	 and	 should	 review	 the	 award	 on	 the	 basis	 of	
whether	 the	 non-signatory	 claim	 falls	within	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	 arbitration	
tribunal.	This	inquiry	should	focus	on	whether	the	non-signatory	claim	was	part	
of	the	dispute	before	the	arbitration	tribunal	and	will	fall	under	Article	V(1)(c)	of	
the	 New	 York	 Convention	 which	 refers	 to	 the	 scope	 of	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	
arbitration	 tribunal.131	If	 the	 enforcement	 courts,	 under	 this	 approach,	 agree	
with	the	tribunal’s	decision	that	the	non-signatory	claim	was	part	of	the	original	
dispute,	the	award	should	be	enforced.	
	
Whether	 the	 objections	 above	 outweigh	 the	 advantages	 of	 the	 proposed	
theory	is	discussed	at	the	final	section	below.	
	
E. Concluding	remarks:	the	advantages	of	the	emerging	theory	and	open	
questions	requiring	future	work		
	
The	 suggested	 theory	 exhibits	 important	 advantages	 over	 the	 existing	non-
signatory	theories.	 In	the	first	place,	 it	can	enhance	certainty	and	predictability	
with	regard	to	the	role	of	non-signatories	in	international	business	transactions.			
Currently	whether	 a	 non-signatory	will	 be	 bound	 by	 an	 arbitration	 agreement	
depends	 on	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 diverging	 non-signatory	 doctrines.	 As	 already	
explained,	 most	 of	 these	 doctrines,	 such	 as	 apparent	 authority,	 piercing	 the	
corporate	 veil	 and	 group	 of	 companies,	 have	 a	 narrow	 scope	 and	 rely	 on	
technical,	 often	 stringent,	 requirements.	 In	 attempting	 to	 persuade	 arbitration	
tribunals	 to	 assume	 jurisdiction	 over	 non-signatories,	 parties	 typically	 rely	 on	
several	disparate	non-signatory	doctrines.132	However,	commercial	reality	often	
fails	 to	 fit	 in	 the	 constraints	 of	 any	 of	 the	 non-signatory	 doctrines,	 frustrating	
claimants’	 most	 reasonable	 attempts	 to	 bring	 a	 non-signatory	 before	 an	
arbitration	tribunal.		
	
What	 is	 further	 problematic	 is	 that	 each	 of	 the	 non-signatory	 doctrines	 is	
subject	 to	 very	 different,	 and	 often	 contentious,	 conflict-of-law	 approaches.133	
For	example,	the	question	of	whether	a	non-signatory	party	will	be	bound	by	an	
arbitration	agreement	can	be	decided	under	a	number	of	national	laws,	including	
the	law	of	the	arbitration	clause	or	the	law	of	the	main	contract	(for	the	theory	of	
																																																								
131	Article	 V1(c)	 of	 the	 New	 York	 Convention	 provides:	 “Recognition	 and	 enforcement	 of	 the	
award	may	be	refused,	at	the	request	of	the	party	against	whom	it	is	invoked,	only	if	that	party	
furnishes	 to	 the	 competent	 authority	where	 the	 recognition	 and	 enforcement	 is	 sought,	 proof	
that:	(c)	The	award	deals	with	a	difference	not	contemplated	by	or	not	falling	within	the	terms	of	
the	 submission	 to	 arbitration,	 or	 it	 contains	 decisions	 on	 matters	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 the	
submission	to	arbitration,	provided	that,	if	the	decisions	on	matters	submitted	to	arbitration	can	
be	 separated	 from	 those	not	 so	 submitted,	 that	part	 of	 the	 award	which	 contains	decisions	on	
matters	submitted	to	arbitration	may	be	recognized	and	enforced.”	
132	To	refer	to	a	characteristic	example	in	the	case	of	Bridas	v.	Government	of	Turkmenistan,	345	
F.3d	 347	 (5th	 Cir.	 2003),	 the	 claimant	 relied	 alternatively	 upon	 several	 third-party	 theories,	
including	agency,	instrumentality,	apparent	authority,	alter	ego,	third-party	beneficiary,	theory	of	
equitable	estoppel,	to	prove	that	the	government	of	Turkmenistan	was	bound	by	an	arbitration	
clause	signed	by	Turkmenneft,	formed	and	owned	by	the	government	of	Turkmenistan.	
133	See	Silva	Romero	&	Saffer	(note	6).	
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assignment	and	third-party	beneficiary),134	the	law	of	the	agent	(for	the	theory	of	
representation),135	the	 law	of	 the	seat	of	arbitration	or	 the	 law	of	 the	company	
(for	the	theory	of	piercing	the	corporate	veil).136		
	
Importantly,	 the	 various	 doctrines	 on	 non-signatories	 are	 not	 consistent	
across	national	 jurisdictions.137	Accordingly,	a	national	court	 that	 takes	a	broad	
approach	to	non-signatories,	perhaps	at	the	initial	stages	of	arbitration	(allowing	
the	 non-signatory	 to	 be	 brought	 in	 an	 arbitration)	 may	 lead	 to	 enforceability	
issues	 if	 the	 award	 seeks	 enforcement	 in	 a	 jurisdiction	 that	 takes	 a	 narrow	
approach	 to	 non-signatories.	 Indeed,	 as	 explained	 above,	 numerous	 awards	
assuming	 jurisdiction	 over	 non-signatories	 have	 been	 set	 aside	 and	prominent	
courts	 have	 taken	 diametrically	 opposing	 views	 on	 whether	 the	 same	 facts	
suggest	 that	 a	 non-signatory	 has	 consented	 to	 arbitrate.	 Eventually,	 the	
multiplicity	of	non-signatory	doctrines	and	national	 laws	on	non-signatories	 in	
different	 jurisdictions	 has	 led	 to	 uncertainty	 and	 fragmentation	 of	 arbitration	
law	on	an	important	legal	issue.				
	
By	contrast,	the	proposed	theory	provides	a	unifying	legal	basis	for	tribunals	
to	determine	whether	to	assume	jurisdiction	over	a	non-signatory	under	a	single	
test.	 While	 the	 proposed	 test	 under	 the	 emerging	 theory	 will	 require	 further	
refinement	by	tribunals	and	national	courts,	unified	transnational	standards	will	
gradually	develop	to	provide	more	certainty	and	predictability	as	to	when	a	non-
signatory	may	participate	in	an	arbitration.		
	
There	are	of	course	a	number	of	questions	that	remain	open	in	relation	to	the	
suggested	 theory.	For	example,	one	 interesting	question	would	be	whether	 the	
test	 for	 tribunals	 to	 assume	 jurisdiction	 over	 non-signatory	 claims	 should	 be	
stated	as	a	legal	rule	(as	discussed	above)	or	as	a	more	flexible	test	that	involves	
a	 balancing	 exercise.	 The	 latter	 can	 provide	 tribunals	with	 some	 discretion	 to	
look	into	the	justifications	behind	the	test,	notably	considerations	about	equity,	
access	 to	 justice	 and	 due	 process,	 before	 deciding	 whether	 to	 extend	 their	
jurisdiction	on	a	non-signatory.	For	example,	 tribunals	may	examine	whether	a	
non-signatory	 has	 been	 invited	 to	 join	 the	 arbitration	 but	 has	 unreasonably	
refused	 to	 do	 so;	 whether	 the	 signatory	 subsidiary	 has	 ceased	 to	 exist	 or	 has	
become	 insolvent;	 whether	 the	 signatory	 claimant	 has	 no	 realistic	 alternative	
route	 to	 justice	 but	 to	 commence	 arbitration	 against	 a	 non-signatory;	 or	
whether,	 unless	 a	 non-signatory	 participates	 in	 the	 arbitration,	 no	 complete	
relief	can	be	accorded	among	the	signatories.	More	practical	factors	may	also	be	
taken	 into	 account	 under	 a	 balancing	 exercise	 test,	 such	 as	 the	 anticipated	
increased	cost	and	delay	in	case	of	participation	of	the	non-signatory	or	whether	
																																																								
134	For	assignment	see	D.	Girsberger,	‘The	Law	Applicable	to	the	Assignment	of	Claims	Subject	to	
an	 Arbitration	 Agreement’	 in	 F	 Ferrari	 and	 S	 Kröll	 (eds),	 Conflict	 of	 Laws	 in	 International	
Arbitration	 (2010)	387;	 for	 third-party	beneficiary,	 see	Born,	 above	 (note	37)	p.	 1457	 and	Am	
Patriot	Ins	Agency	v	Mut	Risk	Mgt	364	F	3d	884,	890	(7th	Cir	2004).	
135	Cf	Art.6	of	the	1978	Hague	Convention	on	the	Law	Applicable	to	Agency.	
136	ICC	10758	of	2000	and	ICC	7626	of	1995.	
137	Cf	Aubrey	Thomas,	“Non-Signatories	in	Arbitration:	a	Good	Faith	Analysis”	14	Lewis	&	Clark	L.	
Rev.	2010,	953,	who	suggests	 the	application	of	 the	principle	of	good	 faith	by	 the	US	courts	 to	
determine	whether	tribunals	should	extend	their	jurisdiction	to	non-signatories.	
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confidentiality	may	be	compromised	if	a	non-signatory	is	joined	in	an	arbitration	
between	two	signatories.		
	
While	 a	 legal	 rule	 accounts	 for	 more	 certainty,	 a	 balancing	 exercise	 may	
provide	for	a	more	expedient	test.		
	
Another	question	that	will	require	further	work	is	the	question	of	which	law	
should	 guide	 the	 tribunal’s	 decision	 on	whether	 to	 assume	 jurisdiction	 over	 a	
non-signatory	claim	under	the	suggested	theory.	There	are	a	number	of	possible	
options,	 including	 the	 law	 of	 the	 seat	 of	 the	 arbitration	 or	 the	 law	 of	 the	
substantive	contract,	especially	since	the	suggested	test	brings	the	inquiry	closer	
to	the	actual	commercial	transaction.	However,	the	more	appealing	option	would	
be	 the	 development	 of	 international	 standards	 on	 non-signatory	 conduct	 that	
transcend	national	laws.		
	
The	 suggestion	 for	 the	 development	 of	 transnational	 standards	 on	 non-
signatories	should	not	be	perceived	as	a	facile	attempt	to	escape	complex	conflict	
of	 laws	 questions.	 International	 arbitration	 has	 traditionally	 been	 a	 fertile	
laboratory	for	the	development	of	transnational	legal	rules	in	a	number	of	areas,	
although	 notably	 not	 for	 non-signatories.138	The	 broadly	 relaxed	 relationship	
between	 international	arbitration	and	national	 laws,	 including	 the	national	 law	
of	the	seat	of	arbitration,139	allows	arbitration	tribunals	to	identify	transnational	
legal	 standards	 that	 emerge	 from	 commercial	 practices	 and	 make	 sense	 for	
business	people.	The	development	of	transnational	legal	rules	on	non-signatories	
will	 thus	 enhance	 certainty	 and	 predictability	 on	 the	 kind	 of	 non-signatory	
conduct	 that	 may	 allow	 tribunals	 to	 assume	 jurisdiction	 over	 non-signatory	
claims.		
	
Overall,	 the	 traditional	 theories	on	non-signatories	have	 the	 same	objective	
as	 the	 proposed	 theory.	 The	 existing	 non-signatory	 theories	 have	 sought	 to	
address	 the	 inadequacies	 of	 international	 arbitration	 with	 regard	 to	 complex	
multiparty	 commercial	 transactions	 by	 purporting	 to	 extend	 arbitration	
agreements	 to	 non-signatories.	 The	 proposed	 unifying	 theory	 addresses	 the	
same	fundamental	problem,	but	rather	than	pursuing,	often	elusive	and	artificial,	
evidence	of	constructive	consent,	it	focuses	on	commercial	reality	and	the	role	of	
non-signatories	in	the	actual	transaction.	For	these	reasons,	the	proposed	theory	
offers	 a	 distinct	 improvement	 on	 resolving	 international	 commercial	 disputes	
involving	non-signatories.			
	
This	article	has	sought	to	demonstrate	that	by	developing	a	unifying	theory	
on	 non-signatories	 with	 a	 single	 test	 under	 a	 single	 set	 of	 rules	 international	
arbitration	 may	 become	 better	 equipped	 to	 accommodate	 the	 needs	 of	
contemporary	 international	 commerce.	 It	 may	 be	 that	 the	 suggested	 test	 for	
tribunals	 to	 assume	 jurisdiction	 needs	 further	 refinement.	 Nevertheless,	 it	 is	
																																																								
138	See	 for	 example,	 the	 seminar	 book	 of	 Fouchard,	 Gaillard	 and	 Goldman	 on	 International	
Commercial	 Arbitration	 (Kluwer	 1999),	 which	 canvasses	 the	 development	 of	 transnational	
substantive	rules	in	international	arbitration.		
139 	See	 the	 seminal	 article	 by	 Jan	 Paulsson,	“Delocalization	 of	 International	 Commercial	
Arbitration:	When	and	Why	It	Matters”	32	Int’l	&	Comp.	L.Q.	53,	59	(1983).	
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necessary	to	begin	to	consider	that,	as	the	article	has	suggested,	the	traditional	
bilateral	 paradigm	 of	 arbitration	 and	 consent-based	 analyses	 may	 have	 been	
outgrown	 by	 the	 realities	 of	 international	 multiparty	 and	 multi-contract	
transactions.140				
	
	
																																																								
140	Strong	above	(note	8)	995.	
